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A Reply to My Critics: 
 










Drawing on my article “Bourdieusian reflections on language: Unavoidable conditions 
of the real speech situation”, this paper provides a detailed response to the above 
commentaries by Lisa Adkins, Bridget Fowler, Michael Grenfell, David Inglis, 
Hans-Herbert  Ko¨gler,  Steph  Lawler,  William  Outhwaite,  Derek  Robbins  and  
Bryan  S. Turner. The main purpose of this “Reply to my critics” is to reflect upon 
the most important issues raised by these commentators and thereby contribute to a 
more nuanced understanding of key questions arising from Bourdieu’s analysis of 
language. 
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First of all, I would like to thank the commentators——Lisa Adkins, Bridget Fowler, 
Michael Grenfell, David Inglis, Hans-Herbert Ko¨gler, Steph Lawler, William Outh- 
waite, Derek Robbins and Bryan S. Turner——for contributing to this Special Issue 
on “Bourdieu and Language”. I am infinitely grateful for their detailed and insight- 
ful  commentaries,  in  which  they  raise  numerous  important  points  and  examine 
 
 
 the weaknesses and limitations of the argument developed in my article “Bourdieu- 
sian reflections on language: Unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation”1. 
Inevitably, my paper gives a partial account of what I consider to be the principal  
elements of a Bourdieusian philosophy of language. The shortcomings of my 
outline, which have been skilfully identified by the commentators on the basis of 
their perceptive engagement with my analysis, need to be addressed in order to 
push the discussion forward and thereby avoid falling into the trap of intellectual 
dogmatism. After all, Bourdieu was deeply suspicious of theoreticism, and the last 
thing he sought to achieve was to invent static conceptual templates for an unre- 
flexive sociology. The discussions sparked by this Special Issue have been intensely 
illuminating to me. In fact, it seems to me that the critical and eclectic spirit in 
which the commentaries are written illustrates, once more, that it would be erro- 
neous to suggest that anyone possesses an epistemic monopoly on the interpreta- 
tion of Bourdieu’s oeuvre. In this “Reply to my critics”, I will try to address the 
key issues raised by the  commentators. 
 
William Outhwaite 
William Outhwaite’s commentary——entitled “Bourdieu and Habermas: ‘Linguistic 
exchange’ versus ‘communicative action’? A reply to Simon Susen”2——conveys an 
important message: useful lessons can be learned from cross-fertilizing the works     
of seemingly opposed thinkers, such as Bourdieu and Habermas. I  share  
Outhwaite’s  view  that  their  approaches  should  be  regarded  as  complementary, 
rather than as antithetical; and I am flattered by his suggestion that I have “pro-  
vided such a comprehensive and illuminating analysis that it is hard to know what    
to add”3. To my mind, this comment reflects both a vital strength and a significant 
weakness of my study. On the one hand, it may well be true that my account is 
sufficiently wide-ranging and insightful to come to the conclusion that it covers 
almost every fundamental aspect of what I consider to be a Bourdieusian philoso- 
phy of language. On the other hand, it is precisely its methodical and logocentric 
character of which many Bourdieusian scholars will be suspicious. Unlike Parsons 
and Habermas, Bourdieu was not a “system builder”; on the contrary, he was pro- 
foundly distrustful of ambitious attempts to provide macro-theoretical frameworks 
capable of capturing the complexity of relationally organized realities by virtue of 
catch-all concepts and explanatory recipes. 
In a way, then, unsympathetic critics may argue that a more appropriate title     
for my article would have been “Anti-Bourdieusian reflections on language”. For   
the system-building spirit in which it is written, including the various transcenden-  
tal claims it makes about the nature of language, may be deemed incompatible     
with the open-minded disposition and the relationalist convictions underlying 
Bourdieusian modes of sociological investigation. It seems to me that such a criti- 
cism is entirely justified, just as I concur with the assessment that it would be erro- 
neous to reduce Bourdieusian analysis to a theoretical framework based on the  
socio-ontological  trinity  of  “field,  habitus  and  capital”.  I  also  believe, however, 
 
 that——as I have sought to show in the article——Bourdieu makes various univer- 
salist assumptions about the constitution of the human world. The pivotal ques-     
tion is not whether or not this contradicts Bourdieu’s intentions (a scholastic  
question which does not have any practical consequences one way or another). 
Rather, the interesting question is what insights can be gained from Bourdieu’s 
analysis, regardless of whether one comes to the conclusion that it is founded on 
“relationalist” or “quasi-transcendentalist” presuppositions (a scientific question 
which permits us to engage with the subject matter itself, rather than with the con- 
notatively charged labels used to represent it). 
Let me attend to the task of responding to six important issues raised by Outh- 
waite. 
(1) Idealism: As far as I can see, Outhwaite is right to remark that my essay 
creates a somewhat questionable opposition between Bourdieu and Habermas. To  
put it bluntly, the former plays the role of a hermeneutic hero in  my analysis, 
whereas the latter “appears as a foil in this article”4. Outhwaite correctly points      
out that this paradigmatic antinomy is  flawed  to  the  degree  that  both Bourdieu 
and Habermas “were reacting against […] ‘hermeneutic idealism’”5.  In other  
words, although it makes sense to suggest  that,  as I  have tried  to demonstrate in  
my paper and elsewhere6, Habermas puts forward a “somewhat idealized model of 
language use”7, whilst Bourdieu favours a “more robust sociological approach”8,  
both reject scholastic accounts which make “particularly strong claims for the place 
of language in human relations”9 and instead conceive of language as only one 
amongst other fundamental elements  of social life. 
(2) Utopianism: Outhwaite has every reason to remind Bourdieusian scholars, 
who have a tendency to misrepresent Habermas’s arguments, that “his image of      
the ‘ideal speech situation’”10 is “almost always presented as an ideal type and refer- 
ence point, rather than as a concrete utopia”11, in his writings. Thus, Habermas——
similar to Bourdieu——is concerned with the unavoidable conditions of real speech 
situations, rather than exclusively with the avoidable conditions of the ideal speech 
situation. It is no accident that Habermas, in his later writings12, has  expressed some 
dissatisfaction regarding the fact that, as he sees it, his conception    of ideal speech 
has been misinterpreted and, in some cases, even caricatured, making him look like 
an armchair philosopher who fails to engage with the messy reality of social life, 
including everyday communication. The truth is, however, that Habermas has been 
insisting for a long time that “[l]anguage is also a medium of domination and social 
power”13, and  that,  based  on  this  central  presupposition, the whole point of 
developing an “idealized model of language use”14 is to recognize that symbolically 
mediated forms of intersubjectivity hardly ever meet the internal and external 
preconditions for the possibility of ideal speech. 
(3) Functionalism: What is the main function of language? Outhwaite perti- 
nently states that we need to question Habermas’s “peculiarly narrow focus on 
language use as essentially  a  means of  coming  to agreement about  states of affairs 
in the world and what to do about them”15. He nonetheless sympathizes with 
Habermas’s  attempt  “to  abandon  the  primacy  of  intentionality  in  favour  of  the 
 priority of mutual linguistic understanding”16, which lies at the heart of the theory    
of communicative action17. In this respect,  it is useful  to distinguish three princi-  
pal levels of understanding: 
 
• understanding in the cognitive sense of comprehending something (Verstehen 
eines Tatbestandes); 
• understanding in the intersubjective sense of comprehending someone else’s 
assertions (Verstehen einer Aussage); and 
• understanding in the empathetic sense of comprehending someone else’s 
motives, feelings or situation (Verstehen eines Mitmenschen). 
 
The picture becomes more complex if we distinguish between the following four 
terms, which are etymologically interrelated: Verstand, Verstehen, Versta¨ndigung and 
Einversta¨ndnis. As a species, we have learned to make use of reason (Verstand) and 
to reach different levels of comprehension (Verstehen) by learning to communicate 
with  one  another  (Versta¨ndigung)  and,  if  necessary,  reach  agreements  with  one 
another  (Einversta¨ndnis).  All  four  practices——that  is,  reasoning,  interpreting,  com- 
municating and agreeing——are conceivable only as (a) cognitive, (b) 
intersubjective and (c) empathetic dimensions. As a species, we have learned to 
reason, interpret, communicate and agree with one another by developing (a) the 
cognitive capacity to argue with and against one another, (b) the intersubjective 
capacity to socialize with one another and (c) the empathetic capacity to feel for one 
another. Far from being reducible to a merely semantic argument, the awareness of 
the etymological affinity between Verstand, Verstehen, Versta¨ndigung and 
Einversta¨ndnis is vital to appreciating the civilizational significance inherent in the 
power of human understanding. 
(4) Foundationalism: Outhwaite draws our attention to the fact that Habermas’s 
“early attempt […] to construct what became his theory of communicative action     
as a linguistic foundation of sociology in ‘universal pragmatics’”18 was initially 
developed in his Gauss Lectures of 1970–71, which Bourdieu may never have read. 
Outhwaite accurately contends that, if Bourdieu had taken note of Habermas’s 
confession of having distanced himself from “the interests of the sociologist”19 by 
trying “to satisfy the explicative demands of the philosopher”20, the French Pasca- 
lian relationalist might have had a more sympathetic attitude towards the German 
neo-Kantian rationalist. Ultimately, for both of them, the paradigmatic opposition 
between philosophy and sociology constitutes an artificial and counterproductive 
antinomy, since neither of the two can be adequately pursued without the other. 
Philosophy without sociology is tantamount to a skeleton without flesh, just as 
sociology without philosophy is tantamount to flesh without a  skeleton.  Haber- 
mas’s objective to provide normative foundations for critical theory by recon- 
structing the rational grounds of communicatively organized societies may be 
considered a pointless enterprise by Bourdieusian scholars. To the extent that 
Bourdieu’s account of language is also based on universalist assumptions about the 
nature of symbolic forms, however, it is not incompatible with the foundationalist 
spirit of Habermas’s endeavour. 
 (5) Dichotomism: Outhwaite perceptively remarks that “it is ironic that Bour- 
dieu, while reacting against French structuralism, remained fixed in binary opposi- 
tions”21. Hence, Bourdieu’s self-declared mission to overcome counterproductive 
antinomies in the social sciences22  is contradicted by the fact that his conception      
of language is based on a number of dichotomous categorizations.  As  I  have  
sought to demonstrate in another study23, this also applies to Bourdieu’s tension- 
laden conception of science. Furthermore, one may wonder to what extent this is   
true for his homological account of the social, which emerges from the interaction 
between field and habitus.24 Regardless of whether or not one comes to the con- 
clusion that Bourdieu has succeeded in overcoming counterproductive antinomies    
in the social sciences, it appears that conceptual binaries will be with us for a long 
time  to come. 
(6) Dogmatism: Perhaps, this is the most important lesson to be learned from 
Outhwaite’s astute comments. There is no point in converting  Habermas  into a 
straw man and in portraying Bourdieu as the king of sociological theory. The nuan- 
ces of their works cannot be captured by creating  a reductive  opposition between  
the former, as a hopelessly abstract philosopher, and the latter, as an empirically 
engaged sociologist. As I have sought to demonstrate elsewhere25 and as Outhwaite 
rightly insists in his commentary, useful insights can be obtained from recognizing 
that “[t]heir respective models of language and society are best seen as complemen- 
tary”26. Far from constituting a merely scholastic undertaking, the project of explor- 
ing key points of convergence, divergence and integration between Habermas and 
Bourdieu27 permits us to cross-fertilize two  seemingly  incompatible  perspectives 
and thereby overcome some of their shortcomings. In this respect, the following  
three insights are particularly important: (a) Habermas’s socio-ontological idealism  
is expressed in his optimistic belief in the preponderant role  of  communicative 
action capable of shaping dialogically structured lifeworlds. (b) Bourdieu’s socio- 
ontological fatalism is epitomized in his pessimistic assumptions concerning the 
predominant force of strategic action mobilized in power-laden fields. (c) Socio- 
ontological realism does justice to both the cooperative and the competitive ele- 
ments permeating the development of human interactions. 
 
Bridget Fowler 
In her paper “Simon Susen’s ‘Bourdieusian reflections on language: Unavoidable 
conditions of the real speech situation’——A Rejoinder”28, Bridget Fowler has 
demonstrated once again why she deserves to be regarded as one of the leading 
Bourdieusian scholars in contemporary British sociology. Her commentary  con- 
tains an abundance of perceptive  and constructive  remarks, which shed light on  
both the strong and the weak aspects of my article. 
I am flattered by her judgement that “Susen’s (2013) critique of Pierre Bour- 
dieu’s analysis of language is impressively erudite”29, as well as by her assessment 
that “Susen’s virtuoso presentation argues convincingly that Bourdieu’s socio- 
analysis of language has certain ontological premises”30.     Furthermore, it is kind of 
 her to suggest that my study “illuminates the subtlety of Bourdieu’s Diltheyan/ 
Weberian heritage”31, expressed in his concern with the existential centrality of the 
human search for meaning, an aspect of Bourdieu’s work which is often ignored, 
particularly by empirical sociologists. I am also pleased to learn that Fowler thinks 
that my piece “displays, with great pathos, Bourdieu’s tragic sense of being human, 
viz. that we are born into a world where we learn to use language; yet, as we do      
so, we are drawn surreptitiously into acceptance of pre-reflexive prejudices”32, which 
are part of the socio-historical horizons in which we find ourselves immersed. I      
am grateful  to Fowler for stating  that she thinks I  write “with the utmost clarity  
and simplicity about these carefully juggled paradoxes of Bourdieu’s historical soci- 
ology”33, notably the various tensions arising from the complementary relationship 
between the naturalization of the social and the  socialization  of  the  natural.  
Finally, it seems to me that Fowler’s refusal to defend Bourdieu’s positions at 
whatever cost demonstrates that she is not interested in proselytizing philosophical 
dogmas or endorsing the unreflexive use of conceptual straitjackets. Instead, she is 
willing to concede that his writings are flawed by internal contradictions, especially 
by those arising from the “tension between objectivist realism and normativist 
constructivism in Bourdieu’s epistemology”34. 
In brief, Fowler and I appear to agree upon the significance of the ontological, 
phenomenological, hermeneutic and historical presuppositions underlying Bourdieu’s 
approach to language, whilst acknowledging that the validity of his paradigmatic 
propositions suffers from serious theoretical tensions  and  contradictions.  Given  
this “common spirit”, it seems to me that there are more areas of agreement than 
sources of disagreement between Fowler and myself. Let me nevertheless focus on 
four points of contention which appear to be crucially important. 
(1) Pessimism:  According  to  Fowler’s  perhaps  most  fundamental  criticism, 
“Susen risks creating a straw man in place of engaging directly with Bourdieu”35. 
More specifically, she maintains that Bourdieu’s interest in “the processes by which  
a privileged minority acquires symbolic profits”36 is essentially inspired by his 
ambition “to understand, and thus overcome, obstacles  to  an  emancipatory pro- 
ject, or ‘rational utopianism’”37. This interpretation leads Fowler to distinguish 
between a “negative dialectic”38 and a “positive dialectic”39, both of which she con- 
siders to be central to the Bourdieusian project. The former is reflected in Bour- 
dieu’s analysis of domination, in particular with regard to struggles over material  
and symbolic resources, which are unequally distributed in social fields. The latter 
manifests itself in Bourdieu’s insistence upon the possibility of emancipation, 
understood as a process which permits human actors not only to recognize rela-   
tions of domination but also to transform them, or at least minimize their detri- 
mental and disempowering consequences. In a nutshell, Fowler accuses me of 
overemphasizing the role of “negative dialectic” and underemphasizing the signifi- 
cance of “positive dialectic” in Bourdieu’s works. Following her account, I portray 
Bourdieu as a pessimistic thinker who remains trapped in socio-ontological fatal- 
ism, positivist scientism and structuralist determinism. On this view, I give the 
misleading impression that Bourdieu fails to do justice to the critical and moral 
 capacities of ordinary actors, who are endowed with the reflexive ability to shape 
their environment in accordance with negotiated criteria of normativity. 
In response to this criticism, it is worth pointing out that,  as William  Outhwa-  
ite observes in his commentary, if there is any straw man in my article, it is Haber- 
mas, not Bourdieu. Bourdieusian sociologists may criticize my analysis for being 
“too Habermasian”, just as Habermasian philosophers may reject my account for 
being “too Bourdieusian”. The idea, however, is not to please either side, just for    
the sake of being taken seriously by both of them. Rather, as Outhwaite rightly 
remarks and as I have tried to show in  an  in-depth  study  of  the  contributions 
made by these two thinkers40, it is more fruitful to regard their theoretical frame- 
works as complementary approaches to the  social. Admittedly, one may come to   
the conclusion that, both in this article and in my book, I have a tendency to rep- 
resent Habermas as a “socio-ontological optimist” and Bourdieu as a “socio-onto- 
logical pessimist”, in order to justify an alternative stance, which we may describe   
as “socio-ontological realism”. Whichever position one may favour, there is abun- 
dant textual evidence to demonstrate that, by and large, Bourdieu’s writings are 
characterized by the preponderance of “negative dialectic” over “positive dialectic”. 
(2) Functionalism: Fowler gives an insightful account of the problems arising 
from the standardization of language based on the imposition of national lan-  
guages. On the one hand, we are confronted with Gramsci’s mystifying view that  
“the formal teaching of normative grammar in the standard language operates as      
an important resource for encouraging a more logical and inclusive ‘national-pop- 
ular’ culture”41. On the other hand, we are faced with  Bourdieu’s  demystifying 
notion that “the national language is […]  the  symbolic  capital  of  the dominant 
class and the traditional intelligentsia, whose children are distinctive in being 
socialized everyday, from birth, into the rules of its use”42. According to the for-   
mer perspective, the standardization of language can be an empowering instrument  
of disempowered groups, an ethnocultural vehicle for social inclusion and integra- 
tion, and hence a potential force of emancipatory transformation. According to the 
latter interpretation, the standardization of language tends to be a self-sufficient 
instrument of the most powerful groups, a contributor to processes of social exclu- 
sion and marginalization, and thus a constitutive element of ideological legitima- 
tion. In essence, Fowler appears to suggest that, because of my criticism of 
Bourdieu’s somewhat one-sided and pessimistic view, my position is too close to  
that of Gramsci and that, in this sense, my claim that “the normalization of lan-  
guage can have both disempowering and empowering consequences for both 
empowered and disempowered groups in society”43  is  misleading. 
In response to this criticism, I would like to stress that, as someone who has, 
throughout his life, been exposed to different linguistic horizons (mainly German, 
English, French and Spanish), lived in different countries (Germany, Scotland, Eng- 
land, France, Spain, Chile and Mexico) and experienced language in radically dif- 
ferent social contexts (from underclass neighbourhoods to elitist academic 
environments), I am fully aware of the processes of inclusion and exclusion which 
can  be  triggered  or  reinforced  by  the  normalization  of  language. Yet, just as we 
  
 
have to be “particularly sensitive to the distinctive linguistic alienation”44 of disem- 
powered social groups, as well as to the distinctive linguistic domination exercised  
by the privileged factions of society, we need to acknowledge that processes of lin- 
guistic self-realization can be experienced by all actors capable of converting their 
encounter with reality into an existential involvement shaped by cognitive reflexiv- 
ity and playful creativity. Sociological functionalism does not have to be conserva- 
tive, just as social functions do not have to be reproductive. Regardless of the 
question of whether or not it is possible, let alone desirable, to convert “Bourdieu  
into a ‘left-Parsonian’”45 and Parsons into a right-Bourdieusian, it is deeply erro- 
neous to reduce actors capable of speech and reflection to mere cultural dupes of 
social reproduction. To understand that homo sapiens is a homo ludens requires 
acknowledging that not every playful performance is a struggle for and over social 
power. 
(3) Sociologism: Fowler  declares that “Susen  risks adopting […] an overly sim- 
plistic binary model”46 by suggesting that, for Bourdieu, “rationally ascertained 
‘validity claims’ are relationally determined ‘legitimacy claims’, since linguistic 
power is unavoidably a matter of social power”47. Fowler considers this account to  
be based on “a simplistic binary opposition”48, which is “unfaithful to Bourdieu’s 
complex nuances”49. In opposition to this view, she contends that, from a Bour- 
dieusian perspective, “dominant elites are constrained to use reason in their own 
internal conflicts […] and [that] this has certain important consequences”50. In 
support of her argument, she refers to Bourdieu’s assertion that “reason, disinter- 
estedness, civic-mindedness”51 are mobilized by dominant social groups as “a sym- 
bolically effective weapon in the struggles of the moment”52. According to Fowler, 
this statement demonstrates that we are confronted with “a ‘reasoned utopian’ the- 
ory of intellectuals”53. This theory, she affirms, implies that Bourdieu regards 
“intellectuals, one of whose main tools is language, as legitimate claimants of the 
universal”54. In short, from Fowler’s standpoint, the distinction between “validity 
claims” and “legitimacy claims” leads to a binary misrepresentation of Bourdieu’s 
multi-layered conception of scientific reasoning. 
In response to this criticism, it seems valuable to observe that, in the quotation 
used by Fowler, Bourdieu examines the nature of social struggles, and the legitima- 
tion of the role of the most powerful in these struggles, in terms of “the symbolic 
universalization of particular interests”55. I can hardly think of a less ambiguous   
way of expressing a binary logic shaping the unfolding of social life. Despite his 
self-declared intention to overcome artificial and counterproductive antinomies in  
the social sciences, binary logics are at work in Bourdieu’s  own writings.56  Given  
his field-based conception of the social, the “force de la rationalité”  is——contrary  
to Fowler’s account——conceived of as subordinate to the “rapports de force” in his 
analysis. To be sure, this is not to suggest that Bourdieu denies the emancipatory 
potential, let alone the existence, of rationality. This does imply, however, that he 
regards pouvoir faire (that is, the performative capacity to do things on the basis of 
Macht) to be a far more powerful social resource than pouvoir raisonner (that is,    
the  cognitive  ability  to  reflect  upon  things  by  virtue  of  Vernunft).  In  fact,  this 
 conviction lies at the heart of his critique of scholastic conceptions  of the  world.57  
In short, to the  extent that he conceives of linguistic power, first and foremost, as     
a form of social power, Bourdieu suggests that “rationally ascertained ‘validity 
claims’ are relationally determined ‘legitimacy claims’”58. The question of whether 
or not one agrees with this view is another matter. 
(4) Reductionism: Perhaps, Fowler’s most substantial criticism is expressed in 
her fourfold allegation that I downplay, or even disregard, the central role of (a)     
the “historical-transcendent”59, (b) the “split or fragmented habitus”60, (c) “con- 
tradiction and crisis”61  and (d) “reflexivity”62  in Bourdieu’s  writings. 
(a) In relation to the role of the “historical-transcendent”, Fowler draws our 
attention to the importance of Bourdieu’s critical engagement with literature and    
art, markets for symbolic goods, so-called mimetic markets and gift exchange. In  
this respect, she maintains that, “[d]espite their brilliance, neither Susen’s earlier 
book (2007) nor this article (2013) pays heed to the variety of these markets for 
symbolic goods”63. More importantly, she insists that it is important to recognize   
that Bourdieu, despite his “earlier critique of the fetishization of culture”64, does     
not downplay, let alone deny, the “singularity”65 of art works and the “reflexiv-  
ity”66 of those who produce them. Besides, Fowler criticizes me for neglecting “the 
field of law”67, which Bourdieu conceives of not only as an “autonomous [legal] 
field”68, functioning in accordance with “an underlying (legal) logic”69 and  sus- 
tained by virtue of “a legal language and knowledge”70, but also as a reflexive    
social field, in which one can develop “a subjective sense of awareness of one’s 
rights”71 and in which, because it “is more justifiable”72, the discursive power of “a 
reasoned argument or truth”73 can prevail over the purposive force of “competing 
hostile interests”74. 
Fowler is right to insist that we need to pay attention to the plurality, complex-  
ity, relative autonomy and internal reflexivity of social fields. I need to point out, 
however, that these are precisely some of the constitutive features of social fields 
examined in my writings, although admittedly on a theoretical, rather than on an 
empirical, level.75 In addition, it is worth mentioning that, far from constituting a 
peripheral element of analysis, the tension between “the historical” and “the tran- 
scendental” has always been one of the central concerns in my studies of Bour- 
dieu’s texts.76 
(b) In relation to the role of the “split or fragmented habitus”, Fowler maintains 
that the fact that “Bourdieu, in his later works, uses increasingly the concept of 
habitus clivé, that is, of a ‘fragmented habitus’”77 remains “[u]nremarked by 
Susen”78. As she rightly spells out, such “a ‘split’ or ‘cleft’ habitus——provoked  by  
a movement from one class to another, or from one discipline to another——
heightens reflexivity”79. Furthermore, insisting upon the intimate relationship 
between thought processes and life experiences, she reminds us of the fact that 
“Bourdieu regards his own case as that of a man who has experienced this radical 
disjuncture of positions within the field of power”80. 
Again, I need to underline that this has been a central concern in my recent 
writings on  Bourdieu.81  In  fact, as I  have argued  on various  occasions,  the rise of 
 the “split or fragmented habitus” is particularly relevant to the critical analysis of 
highly differentiated societies, in which more and more actors are expected to be 
able, as it were, to “commute” between different interactional roles, whilst finding 
themselves immersed in various social fields. The pragmatic capacity to cope with 
both intra-role and inter-role conflicts is vital to the reproduction of life forms in 
which actors are exposed to multiple, and often contradictory, expectations in dif- 
ferent, possibly competing, social fields. In the article, I put this as follows: 
 
Just as human actors are simultaneously determined by several  social  determinants  
(such as class, ethnicity, gender, age and ability), simultaneously influenced by an 
ensemble of coexistential conditions (in particular, sociological, historical, anthropolog- 
ical, psychological and biological factors), and simultaneously immersed in different 
levels of existence (micro and macro, ephemeral and institutional, communal and soci- 
etal), they are simultaneously situated in various social  fields.82 
The  “split  or  fragmented  habitus”,  then,  requires  the  ability  to  participate in 
intersectionally structured realms of interactionality. 
(c) In relation to the role of the “contradiction and crisis”, Fowler claims that 
“Susen analyses doxa, orthodoxy and heterodoxy but, misleadingly, assumes that 
these are static in relation to the dominant and the subordinate  groups”83.  She 
rightly insists that “for Bourdieu crises in domination are ineradicable, just as for 
Marx capitalist finance and industry are inherently prone to contradiction and cri- 
ses”84. Moreover, she follows Bourdieu in suggesting that “in crises  […]  the  
sources of heterodox thought multiply”85  and that, in moments of social rupture     
and transformation, “even the legitimate language loses force, now revealing itself   
as the quaint idiom of a minority: outmoded, artificial and stiff”86. On this view, 
“fetishization is always a fraught and insecure accomplishment”87, that is, every 
socially predominant orthodoxy constitutes a provisionally established discursive 
hegemony. 
Given that I have emphasized the porous, conditional and malleable nature of 
field-specific discourses both in this article and in previous writings88, I am sur- 
prised that Fowler accuses me of portraying doxa, orthodoxy and heterodoxy as 
“static” in relation to dominant and subordinate  groups.  In  fact,  in  accordance  
with Fowler, I state that “social fields can create an infinite number of language 
games, whose ideological complexity escapes the binary logic of an ideological 
antagonism between orthodox and heterodox discourses”89, and  that,  paradoxi-  
cally, “[d]ominant groups can have heterodox discourses, just as dominated groups 
can have orthodox discourses”90. Thus, it is ironic that, despite my constructivist 
contention that “all social arrangements are provisional and malleable”91, and not- 
withstanding my insistence upon the fact that “linguistic relations are always open   
to transformative reconstruction”92, Fowler accuses me of providing an insuffi- 
ciently elastic account of field-specific language use in particular and a “mechanis- 
tic conception of social reality”93 in general. Yet, I agree with Fowler that  
Bourdieu’s conception of contradiction and crisis is far more nuanced than his 
unsympathetic critics are willing to concede and that one may even go as far as to 
 suggest that “Bourdieu offers a theory of revolution”94. The question of whether      
or not his account of revolution is based on a determinist or non-determinist con- 
ception of the social is a different matter. 
(d) In relation to the role of “reflexivity”, Fowler asserts that, “despite his pro- 
claimed understanding of Bourdieu’s agonistic framework, Susen is in danger of 
turning Bourdieu into a ‘left-Parsonian’, whose highly cohesive model of (class) 
reproduction incorporates an ideological canopy of language, perfectly designed to 
protect the interests of the powerful”95. The question of sociological functionalism 
left aside, Fowler takes issue with the following assertion: 
 
Insofar as Bourdieu focuses almost exclusively on the reproductive mechanisms, rather 
than the transformative elements, underlying communicative processes, he overesti-  
mates the extent to which linguistic resources structure and determine largely complicit 
and unreflective agents and underestimates the extent to which language is structured  
and determined by potentially creative and reflective subjects.96 
Fowler attempts to save Bourdieu from this serious charge by arguing that the 
above accusation “cannot hold for Bourdieu’s view of scientific language”97. As 
elucidated in my critical discussion of his “distinction between ordinary and scien- 
tific discourses”98, Bourdieu’s tendency to privilege the latter over the former illus- 
trates, in accordance with Fowler’s observation, that he conceives of enlightening 
epistemic capacities essentially as professional competences, rather than as anthro- 
pological faculties. On this account, only those equipped with the necessary con- 
ceptual and methodological tools are capable of generating reliable representations 
and explanations of reality. 
Yet, as I maintain in my article, “[r]ather than regarding these cognitive capaci- 
ties as an epistemic privilege of scientists and experts, we need to recognize that   
they are built into the human condition”99. Fowler is right to insist that we need        
to reject both the idealist view that “every actor is assumed to have perfect com- 
municative competence”100 and the fatalistic position that individuals constantly 
pursue and, if necessary, justify their personal interests in an atomistic and amoral 
fashion101. Instead, we need to defend the realist position that actors——in social 
fields——relate to one another as both cooperative and competitive entities, just as 
scientists——in the academic field——are carriers of a “‘double consciousness’, 
characterized by both innocence and hypocrisy”102. Motivated by the scholarly spirit 
of conscientious exegesis, one may find cursory statements in Bourdieu’s writings 
which give the impression that, contrary to my criticisms, he does “insist on a 
general model of actors’ capacities for reflexivity”103. Undoubtedly, this applies 
especially to his later writings104, in which Bourdieu appears to have undergone a 
paradigm shift from a somewhat positivist “critical sociology” to a rather interpre- 
tivist “sociology of critique”, whilst the opposite is true for his disciple Luc Boltan- 
ski. However one seeks to interpret or explain intellectual transitions related to the 
complementary paradigms of interpretation and explanation, Bourdieu favours a 
Realpolitik of interest-laden reason over an Idealpolitik of pristine reason. The 
Bourdieusian  mission  consists  in  making  an  invitation  to  reflexive  sociology105, 
 rather than an invitation to a sociology of reflexivity. The most heterodox Fowlerian 
exegesis will not be able to lift the burden of this Bourdieusian orthodoxy. 
 
Derek Robbins 
In his commentary——entitled “Response to Simon Susen’s ‘Bourdieusian reflec- 
tions on language: Unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation’”106——
Derek Robbins raises a number of important issues arising from his meticulous 
discussion of my article. In this rejoinder, I shall limit myself to addressing some 
noteworthy areas of convergence and divergence between his and my analysis of 
Bourdieu’s writings on language. 
Robbins and I appear to agree on at least six essential points. 
(1) It is both possible and useful to provide a systematic account of Bourdieu’s 
conception of language. As Robbins kindly states, “Simon Susen has given us a 
brilliantly lucid expository systematization of Bourdieu’s thinking in respect of lan- 
guage”107. Thus, even if we recognize that Bourdieu makes different sociological 
claims in different periods of his academic trajectory, his writings on language are 
characterized by sufficient methodological and conceptual  coherence  to  assume  
that there is such a thing as a Bourdieusian framework for the critical analysis of 
symbolic forms. 
(2) Valuable insights can be obtained from drawing a multidimensional compar- 
ison between Bourdieu and Habermas. Both Robbins and I endorse the view that       
it makes sense to be “explicit in acknowledging that Bourdieu was opposed to 
Habermas’s ‘communication-theoretic approach’”108, as this permits  us  to  shed  
light on both the philosophical and the sociological implications of the fact that    
“the legitimacy of linguistic validity is always contingent upon the validity of social 
legitimacy”109. Unlike Robbins, but in accordance with Outhwaite, I do not think  
that, in order to defend a Bourdieusian stance, one has “to sustain an anti- 
Habermasian position”110. For, although Bourdieu and Habermas differ in many 
important respects111, they  not only  share  numerous  significant  concerns112, but,  
in addition, their approaches can be fruitfully integrated113. 
(3) We need to take note of the fact that, in the secondary literature, Bourdieu     
is regarded primarily as a sociologist, rather than as a philosopher. It would be 
erroneous, however, to ignore the  various  philosophical  assumptions  underlying 
his sociological writings. As appropriately stated by Robbins, my article “recognizes 
that there are three reasons”114 why, especially amongst Bourdieusians, there is 
considerable “reluctance to consider philosophically discussions of language which 
Bourdieu advanced sociologically and in specific social contexts”115. Somewhat 
sympathetic to my explanation of this omission in the literature, Robbins affirms   
that “the three reasons are well stated”116  and that, contrary to common belief, a    
case can be made for the view that there is such a thing as a “Bourdieusian philos- 
ophy of language”117. 
(4) Whilst acknowledging the significance of several philosophical issues in 
Bourdieu’s  works,  we  must  not  forget  that  his  writings  reflect  a  sociological 
 engagement with the nature of power relations. In this respect, his analysis of com- 
municative practices is no exception. Robbins and I agree, then, that “Bourdieu’s 
concern about language was essentially a concern about power”118. Whatever the civ- 
ilizational role of intersubjective processes oriented towards mutual understanding 
may be, and even if one comes to the conclusion that communicative rationality is   
an emancipatory force allowing for individual and collective empowerment, Bour- 
dieu is right to insist that the  challenge consists in  uncovering the  social functions 
of language, in particular its capacity either to sustain or to subvert power-laden 
codes of legitimacy. 
(5) Reflexivity is not a professional privilege of scientists, but a 
species-constitutive capacity of human actors. We need to resist the positivist ideali- 
zation of scientific knowledge and the fatalistic demonization of everyday modes     
of engaging with the world. Just as the sociological distinction between “layper- 
sons” and “experts” is not a clear-cut separation between two entirely different 
spheres of action and cognition, the epistemological distinction between “common 
sense” and “science” needs to be drawn with considerable reservations in mind. As 
Robbins accurately points out, we concur in that “we both want to acknowledge     
the conceptual capacities of ordinary people and to resist the professionalization of 
social knowledge”119. Boltanski’s conviction that, as sociologists of critique, we need 
to take everyday agents seriously and Bourdieu’s insistence that, as critical sociolo- 
gists, we need to struggle against the instrumentally driven institutionalization of 
knowledge production constitute two complementary positions, inspired by the 
assumption that the pursuit of a genuinely reflexive social science should strive to 
defend the common interests of humanity, rather than the particular aspirations of     
a privileged minority. 
(6) Contrary to widespread belief, “Bourdieu’s account of language is based on 
a number of ontological presuppositions, that is, on a set of universal assumptions 
about the very nature of language”120. Hence, challenging the reductive interpreta- 
tions  of  an  unsustainable  Vulga¨rsoziologie,  “we  agree  that  ontological  predisposi- 
tions are to be found in Bourdieu’s work and that these are in need of further 
exploration”121. The critical study of the socio-ontological features of language illus- 
trates that, far from constituting diametrically opposed or analytically separate  
realms of investigation, philosophy and sociology can be conceived of as two 
mutually inclusive modes of enquiry. Following this line of  interdisciplinary  
thought, Robbins is right to remark that  “Susen identifies  a fundamental ontology   
of language which amounts to a subterranean philosophy of language and which 
underlies Bourdieu’s commitment to an understanding  of  linguistic  communica- 
tion within the social context which makes it possible”122. Regardless of whether 
Bourdieu’s examination of symbolic forms is embedded in a representationalist 
methodology or in “a phenomenological ontology”123, it demonstrates a commit- 
ment to a philosophically inspired and sociologically informed engagement with    
the nature of language. 
 Let us direct our attention to the key issues on which Robbins and I do not 
concur. We appear to disagree on at least four essential points, which are expressed 
in the following charges. 
(1) The charge of dehistoricization: Robbins states that “[i]t should be clear that 
my view is that Susen’s representations and critiques of Bourdieu are diminished 
because they are a-historical”124. More specifically, he explains that his “contention 
is that the majority of the Bourdieu texts which Susen treats as being ‘about  
language’ derive from the decade between 1972 and 1982”125. According to Rob- 
bins, this was a historical period “in which Bourdieu was ‘position-taking’ after 
having seized control of the Centre de Sociologie Europe´enne from Aron after the 
events of May 1968, and leading up to his appointment to the Chair of Sociology at 
the Colle`ge de France at the end of 1981”126. In other words, Robbins questions 
the validity of my claims about Bourdieu’s conception of language on the basis of  
the objection that the textual evidence provided in support of  these  assertions  
draws, to a large extent, on the writings produced during one particular period of 
Bourdieu’s academic career, that is, on a professional phase in which he sought to 
distinguish himself from other scholars, such as Passeron and Aron, and to consol- 
idate his institutional position at the highest level of the French academic system. 
In response to this observation, I want to point out that, whilst my article  
contains numerous references to various writings which Bourdieu published before 
1972 and after 1982127, I am not sure what can be gained epistemically from 
Robbins’s contextualizing considerations. Surely, Robbins is right to highlight that 
scientific writings cannot be abstracted from the historical context in which, or the 
motivational background against which, they are produced. Furthermore, it is true 
that we must be careful not to treat the works of intellectuals as monolithic, homoge- 
nous, uniform, entirely coherent or static conceptual frameworks. Applied to the 
development of influential scholars, periodizing distinctions——such as the “early 
Marx” versus the “late Marx”, the “early Wittgenstein” versus the “late Wittgenstein”, 
the “early Foucault” versus the “late Foucault”, or the “early Bourdieu” versus the 
“late Bourdieu”——are unavoidably contentious. For they fail to do justice to the 
complexity underlying intellectual trajectories of high-calibre thinkers. Robbins’s 
emphasis on the spatiotemporally specific and biographically unique setting in which 
intellectual works are produced is crucially important for anyone committed to the 
sociological study of ideas. Such a historicizing effort, however, does little in the way 
of examining the context-transcending acceptability of philosophical claims to episte- 
mic validity. 
(2) The charge of decontextualization: Robbins makes the following claim: 
 
Language deployed in sociological explanation is always contingent. Unlike philosophi- 
cal or psychoanalytic language, sociological language is always necessarily in a dialecti- 
cal relationship with what it seeks to analyse precisely because much social and cultural 
behaviour is expressed in words and because, therefore, the language of explanation is 
immersed linguistically in what it seeks to  explain.128 
 Ironically, Robbins accuses me of the same limitation of which Passeron accused 
Bourdieu during and after their intellectual fall-out: namely, not only “to treat con- 
cepts philosophically”129, but also to employ sociological terms to “signify a univer- 
sally valid correlation”130 or representation, “rather than as a linguistic device 
adopted contingently to explain the particular situation”131. In view of my apparent 
insensitivity towards this contextual contingency of all epistemic claims to represen- 
tational adequacy and explanatory accuracy, Robbins declares that “[i]t is not just 
that Susen tries to extract a philosophy of language from texts in which Bourdieu  
was writing sociologically. Much more importantly, he de-contextualizes those 
texts”132. In a quasi-Butlerian fashion, Robbins makes the scientistic spirit underly- 
ing Bourdieu’s writings appear insignificant when affirming that——given that 
“Bourdieu was always insistent that his texts were interventions”133——“his writings 
and talks were ‘performative’ rather than referential”134 and, therefore, marked by a 
strong “non-representational dimension”135. Robbins goes on to suggest that “Bour- 
dieu’s writing about language needs to be contextualized in the following two ways: 
first, as itself situated and strategic action; and, second, as the assimilation of previous 
writing”136. The first level requires “interpreting his texts in relation to his social tra- 
jectory”137, whereas the second level entails “identifying socio-historically the textual 
influences which became constitutive of Bourdieu’s synthesized approach”138. The 
first level can be grasped by virtue of a socio-genetic analysis139 of the author’s con- 
stantly shifting biographical——that is, personal and professional——background. 
The second level can be examined by virtue of a socio-hermeneutic analysis capable 
of “acknowledging that Bourdieu’s thinking about language was constituted out of    
a range of influences, which he sought to synthesize”140. 
In response to this criticism, I must stress that I fully support Robbins’s two-   
fold proposition of contextualizing Bourdieu’s writings in terms of both a socio- 
genetic examination of his biographic trajectory and a socio-hermeneutic exploration 
of his intellectual sources of inspiration. Such a position is firmly committed to both 
a socio-genetic and a socio-hermeneutic analysis of intellectual writings. Yet, what is 
problematic in this regard is Robbins’s recommendation that we should follow 
Bourdieu’s suggestion, formulated in relation to Gaston Bachelard, that “epistemol- 
ogy is always conjunctural”141, because “its propositions and thrust are determined  
by the principal scientific threat of the moment”142. Robbins is right to assert that 
“Susen is not inclined to accept this starting point”143, since it fails to allow for       
the possibility of raising claims to validity whose scope of rational defensibility 
transcends the limited horizon of context-dependent legitimacy. Sociologistic con- 
textualism is no less problematic than ahistorical universalism: in the best-case sce- 
nario, it leads to cognitive and normative relativism; in the worst-case scenario, it  
can be used to  endorse a position of cynical  nihilism. 
If, in a pragmatist fashion, we assume that every truth claim is reducible to a 
socio-genetically and socio-hermeneutically determined statement about the consti- 
tution of reality, we exclude the possibility of developing conceptual frameworks 
capable of making reliable assertions whose rational acceptability does not depend  
on relationally constituted, and hence socially contingent, codes of legitimacy. The 
 
 methodological imperative that Bourdieu’s work “be understood developmentally 
[…], rather than a-historically as a set of propositions”144, results  in little more    
than exegesis. In fact, “[t]his recourse to contextualization as defence is circular”145,  
if all it achieves is to describe the development (Entwicklung) of explanatory frame- 
works in a painstakingly meticulous fashion, but without offering any useful con- 
ceptual insights into particular aspects of social reality. Sociologists are right to be 
suspicious of philosophers who tend to decontextualize their assertions and find- 
ings, just as philosophers are right to be critical of sociologists who exclude the 
possibility of making any claims to universal validity. If epistemic cogency were  
only a matter of socio-genetic and socio-hermeneutic determinacy,  science would  
be reducible to a language game driven by completely arbitrary parameters of con- 
textual contingency. There is more to scientific thought than social context. 
(3) The charge of formalization: “He [Susen] offers his account as apparently a 
paraphrase of elements of Bourdieu’s discourse so as to construct a uniform, sys- 
tematic sense”146. According to Robbins, the aforementioned contextualization of 
Bourdieu’s writings “may challenge the systematic formulations which he derives 
from them and, in turn, throw doubt on the validity of some of his critical 
remarks”147. More specifically, Robbins accuses me of advocating what may be 
described as the “philosophization” of sociological texts. According to Robbins, “the 
problem […] is that the framework which Susen adopts for his discussion neces- 
sarily imposes formally a judgement which is not contained in his consideration of 
the substantive position which he derives from Bourdieu’s work”148. For Bourdieu 
“was interested not in contributing to ‘sociolinguistics’ but, rather, in practising 
socio-linguistics. (He insisted on the hyphen.)”149 Thus, given that Bourdieu’s 
writings are not only empirically grounded but also informed by a non-negotiable 
commitment to critical engagement with social practices, it is, according to Rob- 
bins, erroneous to import philosophically inspired criteria into an account of lan- 
guage which is essentially sociological. On this view, “the opposition to the 
attempted development of a formal epistemology of social science”150 à la Popper  
lies at the heart of the Bourdieusian sociology of knowledge, and “the same oppo- 
sition applies in respect to the study of language”151. It is, in other words, not pri- 
marily the “logic of scientific discovery”152, but, rather, the sociology of scientific 
enquiry and of non-scientific experience which concerns the critical eye of a reflex- 
ive epistemology. 
Let me, in response to Robbins’s concern regarding the allegedly distorted for- 
malization of Bourdieu’s argument, make two straightforward  remarks. First,  there 
is a contradiction in Robbins’s argument: on the one hand, he asserts that I pre-    
tend to paraphrase Bourdieu’s writings in my article when, in fact, I make a case   
for my own——if you will, “Boursusenian”——conception of language; on the other 
hand, he complains that I over-systematize Bourdieu’s perspective in my analysis 
when, in effect, there is no such thing as a formal Bourdieusian framework for the 
study of language. It seems to me that Robbins needs to acknowledge that it is log- 
ically unsustainable to level both criticisms against me. If my intention were to 
paraphrase  Bourdieu,  there  would not  be  much  point  in  developing  a systematic 
 
 framework which both draws upon and goes beyond the epistemic positions 
defended in his writings. To put this in an intellectually constructive manner, my 
article is not supposed to be a paraphrasing exercise, based on a descriptive repre- 
sentation or repetition of Bourdieu’s account of language. Rather, it aims (a) to   
cover what I consider to be the most important dimensions of Bourdieu’s writings   
on language, (b) to present these dimensions in a systematic fashion and (c) to   
reflect not only upon the key insights gained from such a systematizing endeavour 
but also, more importantly, upon the limitations of Bourdieu’s conception of lan- 
guage, thereby taking the discussion to a post-Bourdieusian level. 
Robbins should recognize that tautological statements——such as “the ‘founda- 
tions of the social’ need to be defined in social exchange which entails establishing 
socially inclusive institutional foundations of social-theoretical discourse”153,  or  
“the language of explanation is immersed linguistically in what it seeks to 
explain”154——will not take us far. Sociologistic approaches lead to little more than 
the formulation of constructivist truisms, emphasizing the relational, and hence 
relatively arbitrary, constitution of social arrangements. Instead of subscribing to 
sociologistic dogmas, we need to confront the challenge of exploring the founda- 
tional elements of human life, which——by definition——exist in any form of soci- 
ety, regardless of its spatiotemporal specificity. 
Whilst I admire Robbins for his impressively wide-ranging knowledge of, and 
painstakingly meticulous engagement with, Bourdieu’s writings, I am reluctant to 
confine our analytical task to the fruitless exercise of exegesis. Such scholastic 
endeavours lead to futile discussions about “right” and “wrong” interpretations of  
the master’s own words, telling us little, if anything, about the constitutive features  
of the subject in question, that is, about the nature of language. Ironically, Robbins 
remains trapped in the stifling parameters of symbolic power and scholastic legiti- 
macy when aiming to raise validity claims on the basis of exegetical considerations 
oriented towards the ideal of interpretive accuracy. Bourdieusians are in danger of 
undermining the Bourdieusian spirit not only if they convert sociological investiga- 
tions into philosophical dogmas, but also if they attribute more importance to the 
spatiotemporal contexts in which validity claims are raised than to the epistemic 
content of these claims. In short, drawing upon Bourdieu’s insights, my aim was to 
shed light on the nature of language, rather than on the writings of a great thinker. 
We must resist the temptation to treat Bourdieusian tools as “Bourdivine” dogmas.   
If thinkers are considered more insightful than their thoughts, then thoughts are        
in danger of becoming thoughtless. It is vital to examine by whom, to whom, where, 
when, and why something is being said. It is no less important, however, to scruti- 
nize what is being said. 
(4) The charge of misinterpretation: Perhaps the most central source of potential 
misunderstanding is the examination of Bourdieu’s approach to the relationship 
between ordinary and scientific knowledge. Robbins stresses the importance of this 
dimension in the following statement: 
 
 I do not think that evidence exists for the contention that Bourdieu believed in the superi- 
ority of scientific discourse within a hierarchy of discourses. Bourdieu wanted to sustain 
the authority of social science so as to safeguard his power to subvert the hierarchy;     
but, of course, that ran the risk of actually perpetuating or being thought to perpetuate   
the structure he wanted to disrupt. Similarly, Bourdieu’s apparent support for stable, 
instituted discourse in opposition to “ephemeral” discourse was an instrumental strategy, 
equally wide open to misinterpretation, to mobilize existing sources of power for the benefit 
of the relatively impotent. To offer this judgement in these terms is, undoubtedly, to 
accept Bourdieu’s account of the unavoidable homogeny between social trajectory and 
cultural/intellectual identity in defence of that account.155 
The above passage is problematic for several reasons. 
(a) Rather than expressing “support for stable, instituted discourse in opposi-  
tion to ‘ephemeral’ discourse”156, the Bourdieusian spirit, imbued with Foucaul-   
dian virtues, invites us to endorse the subversive discourses of the underdog, which 
tend to escape the picture of instituted discourses, notably those produced and 
reproduced by legitimized and legitimizing institutions. Of course, Robbins is right  
to insist that “ordinary discourses are not pure expressions of ordinary experience,   
as presupposed by the notion of habitus, but, rather, partially assimilated versions     
of instituted discourses”157. Yet, when analysing the interaction between common- 
sense knowledge and expert knowledge158  in terms of “the relationship between    
the inherited dispositions of individuals and public positions represented by insti- 
tutions”159, we must not conflate “scientific discourses” with “instituted discourses” 
and “ordinary discourses” with “ephemeral discourses”. For just as there are 
ephemeral scientific discourses, there are instituted ordinary discourses. 
(b) Despite his sympathy for the socially disempowered, there is an abundant 
amount of evidence to demonstrate that Bourdieu, drawing upon Marx and Durk- 
heim, believed in the superior epistemic capacities of science and the deceptive 
nature of doxa and common sense.160 One may criticize Boltanski’s fierce opposi- 
tion to Bourdieu’s alleged scientism on many grounds. Yet, even if one cherry-   
picks counterexamples, particularly from the latter’s later works161,  there  is  no  
point in denying that Bourdieu’s conception of reflexive sociology is based on an 
epistemic hierarchy, according to which the conceptual and methodological tools     
of science enable us to uncover underlying causal mechanisms whose determining 
power largely escapes common-sense perceptions of the world. Moreover, Bour- 
dieu’s writings are weakened by a considerable lack of attention  to  the reflexive  
and discursive capacities mobilized by ordinary actors in everyday situations. If 
Robbins is not willing to accept this, his position is not dissimilar to that of con- 
temporary Marxists who claim that the model of base and superstructure is simply     
a playful metaphor, rather than an explanatory framework. Robbins does not do 
himself, let alone Bourdieu, any favours by pushing the limits of interpretive elas- 
ticity to the point of dogmatically motivated untenability. 
(c) Robbins’s suggestion that Bourdieu’s endorsement of scientific discourses 
was simply a context-specific strategy employed in the interest of marginalized and 
disempowered social groups is questionable. One does not need to be an autonomist 
 
 Marxist, à la John Holloway162, to be suspicious of the idea of “[a]ppropriating the 
legitimacy of instituted social science […] to advance the political interests of those 
without voice”163. Such a paternalistic position portrays reflexive social scientists as 
the enlighteners whose mission is to safeguard the to-be-enlightened,  deceived  by 
the illusions of doxa and common sense. If the “mission”164 of reflexive intellectuals 
is to “go along with the recognized status of social science in order to liberate        
and give voice to ‘vulgar’ views”165, then human emancipation is reduced to an 
exogenously induced process, orchestrated by those who, because of their privileged 
position, are able to see through the veil of doxa and are, therefore, entitled to 
emancipate all those incapable of emancipating themselves. 
 
Steph Lawler 
In her commentary, entitled “Unequal persons: A response to  Simon Susen”166, 
Steph Lawler raises a number of important  issues concerning Bourdieusian studies  
of language. It seems to me that we concur on most points and differ on remark-   
ably few. I am pleased to learn that Lawler thinks that my “paper gives us a wide- 
ranging and provocative account of the shortcomings of a Bourdieusian approach     
to language”167. More specifically, it is worth mentioning that we agree on five    
main levels. 
(1) We both insist on the reflexivity inherent in language. Lawler’s comments 
illustrate that we both endorse a non-determinist understanding of the social, as 
reflected, for instance, in the following  statement: 
Susen’s analysis is no doubt an important  reminder——at  least for those of us who     
tend towards determinism——of the possibilities for linguistic change and indeed for 
change through language. Clearly, he is right to point out that people do not mindlessly 
reproduce language games and that reflection in and through language is an important 
means through which we engender new forms of insight and communication.168 
On this view, language can be an empowering social tool which permits human 
beings not only to reflect upon the world, but also to act upon and transform it. 
(2) We both emphasize the sociality of language. Providing us with plenty of 
examples which “show how the possibilities for  communication  are  blocked by 
both linguistic and extra-linguistic factors”169, Lawler argues with great skill and 
pungent lucidity that language cannot be abstracted from the social  contexts  in 
which it is used, let alone “from the persons who produce it”170. On this account, 
linguistically articulated judgements are a deeply social, rather than merely episte- 
mic, affair; “the case of those being judged or those doing the judging”171  takes  
place not in a bubble of neutral and disinterested parameters, but in a relationally 
constructed space of contextually contingent jeux (games) and enjeux (stakes). 
(3) We both stress, although admittedly to varying degrees, the bodily nature of 
linguistic practices. As Lawler pertinently observes, “[i]n written communication,  
the body may slip from sight, and indeed one effect of formal linguistic registers is 
to  divorce  language  as  spoken  by  an  embodied  person  from the written text”172. 
 
 Yet, as she accurately states, “[l]anguage is a bodily technique”173, and it is “pro- 
duced by embodied social actors”174. To the extent that our “bodily hexis”175 is 
unavoidably “brought into play within real speech acts”176, there is no such thing      
as a disembodied communicative action. Even when we communicate with others  
via technological devices, permitting us to convert face-to-face proximity into a 
dispensable element of mutual comprehensibility, and even when we communicate 
with others on the basis of painted or printed symbols, allowing us to transform 
spatiotemporal immediacy into an expendable aspect in the construction of inter- 
subjectivity, language emanates from embodied modes of human  agency. 
(4) Whilst Lawler gives a much more nuanced account of this dimension than 
I do, we are both interested in the role of identity in linguistic practices. Language    
is both a classifying and a classified force based on the creation of identitarian cate- 
gories. As Lawler correctly insists, “language classifies, and it classifies the classi- 
fier”177. The power of language, then, cannot be dissociated from the power of 
identity. Lawler sheds light on the relationship between language and identity in 
terms of six social processes: 
(a) processes of signification: “identity  speaking”178; 
(b) processes of projection: “judgements are routinely made on the entire bodily 
hexis of the speaker, assumed to reveal their identity”179——“identities were 
assumed  to  be […]”180; 
(c) processes of stratification: “identities […] are all the products of unequal social 
relations”181, “classed identities”182; 
(d) processes of regulation: “a normalization not only of certain linguistic forms, 
but also of the identities of the people who use them”183; 
(e) processes of classification: “[…] identity may be conferred, in part, on the basis 
of accent”184 […] “[b]oth features——accent and idiom, as well as bodily 
hexis——are  brought into play within real speech acts and combine to pro-  
duce a conferred identity”185;  and 
(f) processes of valorization: “specific forms of English expression are held to indi- 
cate both identity and value”186, and “different forms of identity have differ-   
ent values”187. 
In short, Lawler is right to point out that linguistically mediated constructions     
of identity are conceivable only as (a) interpretive, (b) projective, (c) divisive, (d) 
regulative, (e) classificatory and (f) value-laden processes. 
(5) We are both concerned with the role of legitimacy in linguistic practices. 
Binary separations——such as “correct” versus “incorrect”, “national” versus 
“regional”, and “paradigmatic” versus “peripheral” forms of language use188——are 
crucial to the normalizing function of symbolic  power. Lawler  provides instruc-  
tive examples: 
• “dictatorships seek explicitly to police language use and, in some cases (as in 
Franco’s Spain), to suppress regional languages  altogether”189; 
 
 • “in the UK, there are numerous deviations from standard English (Received 
Pronunciation, often——though inaccurately——understood as ‘accentless’ 
English), not all deviations are worth the same”190; 
• “the complex linguistic codes of Black adolescents in Harlem […] will get 
them nowhere in educational markets”191; and 
• “[t]he historian David Starkey——speaking in Standard English while appear- 
ing on the BBC’s flagship news and current affairs programme, Newsnight,  
and while commenting on the London riots of 2011——claimed that  ‘the  
whites have become black’”192. 
In brief, “speech cannot carry a ‘pure’ form of words”193. In everyday interac- 
tions, the acceptability of linguistically formulated claims to validity depends upon 
the legitimacy attached to a speaker’s position in society. The relational contin-  
gency of social authority expressed through linguistic codes of legitimacy, however, 
is——as Lawler, drawing upon Gayatri Spivak, reminds us——not simply a 
question of “Who can speak?”, but, more importantly, of “Who will listen?”194. To 
understand, in other words, that “[i]t is no good speaking if nobody listens”195 
requires comprehending that there is no symbolic power without social recognition. 
Even though, as illustrated in the previous reflections, areas of agreement by     
far outweigh matters of disagreement between Lawler and myself, let me make a   
few remarks on aspects which, I believe, may be worth clarifying in this context. 
Lawler’s main objection concerns the problem of linguistic idealism. Her accusation 
that, despite my self-declared proposition to examine the conditions of the real 
speech situation, I remain trapped in an idealistic account of language use is per- 
haps most clearly conveyed in the following assertions: 
 
For Susen, language is socially formed but also has the capacity to escape its social 
determinants  and even to reshape social  relations.196 
 
[…] I wonder whether, in the practice of social interaction, language in fact realizes its 
own possibilities to the extent that Susen implies that  it  does.  It  seems  to  me that 
Susen wants to endow language itself with an agency that sets it free from its structural 
constraints. Yet, while Susen is attentive to the activities of actual language users, his 
emphasis tends to underplay the differences between language users. More widely, I  
want to suggest that his emphasis is in danger of removing language from its users, who 
are embodied social actors who make judgements about themselves and others. Their 
identities, their embodiment and their judgements are  all  the  products  of  unequal  
social relations. While I agree with Susen that language can escape its constraints, I 
wonder to what extent in practice it does do so: to what extent does it in fact undo     
social distance and inequality? To what extent are the hidden  (because naturalized) 
effects of domination and violence made and reproduced, rather than undone, through 
language?197 
 
Of course, the problem with using examples is that counter-examples can be prolifer- 
ated. I use them here, however, to indicate some of the other possibilities which, I     
think, Simon Susen overlooks and which may threaten  to  undermine  the  optimistic 
tenor of his argument.198 
 
 In response to these critical remarks, let me make a few straightforward points, 
which, to my mind, indicate that Lawler and I tend to concur on most issues aris-   
ing from Bourdieu’s writings on  language. 
Whilst  I  do  believe,  and  hope,  that  language can “reshape social relations”199, 
my intention has not been to claim that “language […] has the capacity to escape    
its social determinants”200. In fact, I have argued precisely the opposite,  as  
expressed in the following contentions: 
 
Linguistic conceptions of reality can never escape the societal determinacy of symboli- 
cally  mediated interactionality.201 
 
Just as human actors are simultaneously determined by several  social  determinants  
(such as class, ethnicity, gender, age and ability), simultaneously influenced by an 
ensemble of coexistential conditions (in particular, sociological, historical, anthropolog- 
ical, psychological and biological factors), and simultaneously immersed in different 
levels of existence (micro and macro, ephemeral and institutional, communal and soci- 
etal), they are simultaneously situated in various social  fields.202 
The whole point of my proposition to argue that there are specific unavoidable 
conditions of real speech is to demonstrate that language, although it cannot be 
reduced to a mere product of sociological determinants, cannot be properly under- 
stood in isolation from several relationally contingent variables, notably “sociality”, 
“legitimacy” and “symbolic power”. Insofar as she portrays linguistically mediated 
identities as mere “products of unequal social relations”203, Lawler is in danger of 
unwittingly endorsing sociologistic determinism. As she convincingly states, “peo- 
ple do not mindlessly reproduce language games”204. The possibility of “change 
through language”205 is indicative of the civilizational role of  rationally  coordi- 
nated and discursively negotiated interactions. Given that, as she concedes, “reflec- 
tion in and through language is an important means through which we engender  
new forms of insight and communication”206, it would be erroneous to reduce the 
discursive reflexivity derived from communicative rationality to a sheer epiphe- 
nomenon of struggles over social legitimacy. Rather than suggesting that “[t]he 
authority of different language forms […] derives not  from  language  itself, but 
from the position of speakers within social  fields […] and  from the  status attached 
to their habitus”207, we need to explore the various factors——including critical 
rationality——which can determine the legitimacy attached to linguistically articu- 
lated claims to validity. We need to avoid falling into the traps of both linguistic 
idealism, according to which language can  be abstracted from its social conditions  
of production, and sociologistic determinism, according to which the use of lan- 
guage is entirely governed by power relations. By doing so, we are able to embrace   
a more balanced view of socio-ontological realism, which recognizes that language is 
both a product and a producer of social relations. 
 
 Michael Grenfell 
In his provocative commentary——entitled “‘Shadow boxing’: Reflections on Bour- 
dieu and language”208——Michael Grenfell puts forward several strong arguments. 
Although his contribution is, in many respects, critical of my article, Grenfell 
emphasizes that he thinks that——given the relevance of Bourdieu’s “concerns for 
epistemology and vigilance”209 for sociological analysis——“this Special Issue is all 
the more welcome”210. Despite his serious reservations regarding my theoretical 
outline, Grenfell kindly suggests that “Susen’s list of presuppositions, so ably pre- 
sented and discussed”211, is a way of taking the debates on  Bourdieu’s contribu- 
tions to contemporary studies of language to a deeper level. Thus, he states that he 
“accept[s] that this present Special Issue goes some way to  elucidating,  if  not  
finally nailing, Bourdieu and language from a socio-philosophical point of view”212 
and that “Susen’s reflections are a welcome contribution in that endeavour”213. It 
seems to me that Grenfell and I agree on at least three noteworthy points. 
(1) We need to be aware of the misinterpretations that are particularly common 
amongst “what Bourdieu called an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ audience”214.  What Grenfell  has 
in mind is the fact that  the “grounding  in neo-Kantian  metaphysics that  gave birth 
to phenomenology and existentialism”215, both of which crucially influenced Bour- 
dieu’s own intellectual development, is often “badly understood outside mainland 
Europe”216. To put it bluntly, this should be reason enough to shed light on the 
philosophical dimensions underlying Bourdieu’s account of language. 
(2) Taking note of these philosophical aspects in Bourdieu’s writings, Grenfell 
and I agree that “[i]ssues of language are all-pervasive in his work”217 and that their 
paradigmatic centrality manifests itself on various analytical levels. Grenfell pro- 
vides a useful summary, which distinguishes “four principal strands”218 in Bour- 
dieu’s writings on language: (a) language as an empirical social phenomenon; (b) 
language as a mediating social force; (c) language as a specialist instrument of sci- 
ence; and (d) language as an object of philosophical contemplation.219 Grenfell rightly 
points out that Bourdieu was  profoundly critical  of the fourth  level, as  expressed  
in his sceptical remarks on “sociolinguistics (Labov), philosophy (Searle, Austin)  
and universal grammar (Chomsky)”220. In opposition to theoreticist approaches to 
language, ‘‘Bourdieu argues very strongly that his own conceptual tools were logi- 
cally necessitated by the empirical data in which he immersed himself”221, thereby 
stressing the importance of the substantive level for his praxeological engagement 
with symbolic forms. 
(3) Grenfell and I concur in insisting on the relational nature of language. As 
Grenfell correctly states, “[w]ords for Bourdieu always imply relationships”222, that 
is, not only the relation between “signifiers” and “signified”, but also “the inten- 
sional [sic] relation between a human being/social agent and their environment”223. 
The previous misspelling is meant to remind us of the fact that language is “a 
structure that is both structured and structuring”224  and that, far from constituting   
“a set of neutral signifiers”225, it creates meaning in value-laden ways. Put differ- 
ently, language “makes us see certain things and not see other things, and——more 
 
 importantly——it permits us to see some things and precludes us from seeing other 
things in a particular way”226. Considering the field-specific differentiation of the 
social, language is always power-laden and “knowledge is always interest-laden”227. 
Due to its relational nature, “meaning is never once-and-for-all, neutral, singular, 
transmitted from one to another  in  a  Lockean  sense  of  perfect  communication, 
but always open to interpretation”228. In a radical sense, then, every linguistic rep- 
resentation, because of its socially contingent constitution, is a potential misrepre- 
sentation.  To  the  extent  that  social  relations  are  imbued  with  power  relations, 
language is potentially “contested but gravitates towards the dominant sense occur- 
ring in a social space in a centripetal way”229. In short, linguistic relations are not 
only social relations but, given their value-laden  and  interest-laden constitution, 
they are also power relations. 
Finally, owing to his opposition to theoreticist approaches  to  language, 
expressed in his insistence upon the socio-relational constitution of symbolic forms, 
it comes as no surprise that “Bourdieu seems to have offended an academic field      
to such an extent that, for the most part, they deal with him by  ignoring him”230.  
This should be reason enough to take him seriously and to demonstrate that the 
philosophical depth of his writings is informed by the sociological rigour of his 
empirical investigations. 
Allow me, in the remainder of this section, to reply to some of Grenfell’s excel- 
lent criticisms, which he has so elegantly formulated when reflecting on the short- 
comings and limitations of the arguments developed in  my  article.  Whilst  he  
makes numerous perceptive points, it seems to me that four of his critical remarks  
are particularly worth revisiting. Before tackling these, let me briefly address three 
forms of misinterpretation. 
(1) It is a bit puzzling that most of Grenfell’s quotations are taken from the 
opening pages of my article. Not only does one get the impression that there is    
little, if any, indication that he has read the entire body of the text properly, but    
what is more worrying is that, owing to this omission, he fails to engage with 
substantial parts  of  my argument. 
(2) Given his concern with misinterpretations and Anglo-Saxon scholars who 
“do not quite ‘get it’”231, his misrepresentation of Husserl and Heidegger is surpris- 
ing. Without providing any kind of textual evidence in support of his claim, he 
erroneously asserts that “Husserlian ‘emergence’ is just as dangerous as Heideggeri- 
an ‘transcendence’, since both reify sense and meaning, rather than seeing them as    
a dynamic social process of (re)construction”232. Precisely the opposite is true; the 
whole point of their phenomenological investigations——notably of Being and 
time233——is to study meaning in terms of its historical contingency. 
(3) Grenfell misparaphrases me on several occasions. Let me give a few exam- 
ples. 
(a) He maintains that I “suggest that, because it is right to say there is a Bour- 
dieusian study of language, it would be a contradiction to affirm there is such    
a thing as a Bourdieusian theory of language”234. My article, however, states 
 
 that, due to Bourdieu’s fierce opposition to theoreticist approaches to  lan- 
guage, “it seems that, whilst [not because] it is right to point out that there is      
a Bourdieusian study of language, it would be a contradiction  in  terms to 
affirm that there is such a thing as a Bourdieusian theory of language”235. 
(b) Rather than claiming that “it is unjustified to characterize Bourdieusian soci- 
ology as a ‘language-theoretic’ approach to the social”236, I declare that this 
appears to be the case, because, “according to Bourdieu, language constitutes 
only one amongst other social dimensions and the linguistic field only one 
amongst other social fields”237. 
(c) Grenfell states that the various “points [of the article] are made by Susen to 
explain the absence of what he calls ‘ontological presuppositions’ in the litera- 
ture on Bourdieu and language”238, when, actually, my analysis aims  to  
explain their tacit but unavoidable presence both in  the  literature  and  in  
social life, and thus to problematize the lack of recognition concerning their 
existence and significance. 
(d) It is not true that, as Grenfell mistakenly announces, “Susen […] says that, 
whilst there is a Bourdieusian sociology of language, there is no such thing as 
Bourdieusian philosophy of language”239. Contrary to Grenfell’s misreading, 
the whole point of my article  is to argue against this common  misconcep-  
tion. 
These are only a few examples which illustrate that Grenfell misparaphrases me 
on various occasions and, consequently, obscures one of the key objectives of my 
article, which consists in challenging common misconceptions of Bourdieu’s philo- 
sophically inspired and sociologically informed writings on  language. 
Let us consider four of Grenfell’s central accusations, which seem worth dis- 
cussing in some detail. 
(1) The charge of misinterpretation: Reflecting upon the “misuses and abuses”240 
of Bourdieu, and acknowledging that his “own position within Bourdieusian stud-   
ies […] has moved from advocate to ‘party-pooper’”241, Grenfell complains that 
many approaches to Bourdieu are guilty of “misinterpreting what he intends”242      
and of failing to realize that “[t]hey make too much of Bourdieu and too little”243. 
Somewhat provocatively, Grenfell uses the metaphor of “shadow boxing”244 to 
convey the fact that “there is a great deal of intense activity, blows are directed at 
Bourdieu, but few are landed, since he is not quite standing where they think he 
is”245. In addition, Grenfell contends that “[t]his is never truer than in the case of 
language”246. 
Let me, in response to this allegation, make three straightforward points. 
(a) There is nothing original about asserting that different scholars may misun- 
derstand or misrepresent Bourdieu in several ways and on various levels. In 
fact, the principal purpose of engaging in critical debates on the complexity of 
his work is to recognize that there is not one single, let alone one accurate, 
interpretation of his writings. Otherwise, there would be little point in dis- 
cussing his contributions, or those of other major thinkers, in the first place. 
 
 (b) Whatever Grenfell’s legitimate or illegitimate misgivings with regard to recent 
controversies in Bourdieusian studies may be, the point is not to provide the 
right account of Bourdieu’s conception of language, but to move the argu-  
ment forward. In other words, the objective of my article is not exegesis, but    
to contribute to a more insightful understanding of language. Rhetorical devi- 
ces——such as the assertion that some tend to make both “too much and 
too little”247 of Bourdieu——fail to deepen our understanding of his 
philosophically inspired and sociologically  grounded study of symbolic forms. 
(c) Whilst Grenfell’s “shadow boxing” metaphor applies to recent developments in 
Bourdieusian studies, it is relevant to many other influential scholars who have 
already passed away and are, therefore, unable to respond to the issues raised  
by their posthumous critics. This does not mean, however, that we should 
withdraw from the task of interpreting, and making use of, their works. 
(2) The charge of conceptual reification: Grenfell describes this issue as follows: 
 
[…] one of the strengths (possible weaknesses) of Bourdieu’s theory and method is      
that it almost demands to be critiqued in its own terms. Not to do so is somehow to     
miss the point. To do so, however, risks becoming  ensnared in Bourdieusian language,  
of possibly reifying his concepts, or applying a broad metaphorical sweep to narratives. 
Both needed to be avoided. Bourdieu is probably at his most slippery and convincing      
in the way he uses language and, indeed, the analytical terms themselves. No wonder     
he  told us to  beware of language.248 
Let me, in response to this criticism, make two straightforward remarks. 
(a) Rhetorical catchphrases——such as “Bourdieu is probably at his most slippery 
and convincing in the way he uses language”249——may  sound provocative,  
and at first glance perhaps even insightful, but intellectually they achieve little 
in the way of contributing to a better understanding of Bourdieu’s conception 
of language. It is open to question whether or not Bourdieu has succeeded in  
his persistent attempt to move away from the French intellectualist habit of 
mobilizing unnecessarily complicated terminological tools in order to make 
remarkably simple points. Whatever the answer to this question may be, how- 
ever, Bourdieu——in his mission to break out of conceptual straitjackets——
is certainly not “at his most slippery […] in the way he uses language”250. 
(b) Whilst, along with Derek Robbins and others, I share the view that we must 
resist the  temptation to reify Bourdieu’s concepts, I find  Grenfell’s approach  
to this issue contradictory. Consider, for instance, the following two state- 
ments: 
 
[…] terms such as habitus and field are to be received not simply as metaphorical 
descriptors, heuristic devices to elucidate social processes but scientific instruments 
which are “realistically” present within the very phenomena from which they are 
involved.251 
 
 Indeed, I have always adopted the practice of writing his key concepts——field, habitus, 
capital, etc.——in  italics in order to draw attention to the fact that they need to be read   
as dynamic epistemological matrices entering a narrative, not as mere metaphorical 
descriptors.252 
On the one hand, Grenfell proposes to make use of Bourdieusian concepts as 
“hard” scientific tools. On the other hand, he suggests Bourdieusian  concepts  
should be employed as “soft”——that is, adaptable and malleable——terminological 
reference points. We cannot have it both ways. To be sure, Grenfell is absolutely 
right to warn of the reification of Bourdieusian concepts. In fact, Bourdieu himself 
was wary of sociological dogmatism, as expressed in the following passage: 
 
It is very common to reduce “Bourdieusian thought” to a few key terms, and usually   
even just a few book titles, and this then leads to a kind of closure: “reproduction”, 
“distinction”, “capital”, and “habitus”——all of these terms are often used in misleading 
ways, without really understanding what they stand for, and hence they become slo-  
gans. In reality, however, these concepts——these frameworks——are only principles 
for scientific work, which is usually of mere practical nature; they are synthetic or 
synoptic notions, which serve to provide research programmes with scientific 
orientations.253 
Even if one sympathizes with Bourdieu’s clarifications on this matter, 
philosophers of science may have good reason to be suspicious of such vague 
recommendations. Whilst we should resist the reification and dogmatization of 
social-scientific jargon, we need to recognize that concepts such as “field”, “habi- 
tus” and “capital” represent constitutive components of Bourdieu’s social-scientific 
ontology, rather than elastic metaphors of an imaginative and playful poetry. 
(3) The charge of overinterpretation: The view that my article suffers from a ten- 
dency to “over-interpret” Bourdieu is expressed in Grenfell’s accusation that I put 
words in the master’s mouth and thereby create a terminology which pretends to     
be “Bourdieusian” but which in fact is, if anything, “Susenian”. The significance of 
this allegation is conveyed in the following  statements: 
 
Already in the title I find much to question: Is it “reflections” or “reflexions”? What   
does he mean by “conditions”? Why are they supposed to be “unavoidable”? What is 
“real”, or is it “realist”? Is it “real speech situation” or “speech event”? These questions 
are not simply those of a pedant, but raise the presuppositions,  tropes, implications      
and interests that resonate with my own academic signifiers as I work to position this 
article in the social space that is Bourdieusian scholarship.254 
 
Susen’s is an interesting list of characteristics that might be used to describe language 
from a Bourdieusian perspective: sociality, dialecticality, signifiability, doxicality, dis- 
cursivity, legitimacy, ideology, contestability, commodifiability, symbolic power. I did 
ask myself whether he made some of these up——“commodifiability”? Again, I am not 
trying to be pedantic; rather, I am simply attempting to draw attention to the practice      
(a theoretical account of which we have from Bourdieu) of working in a field of prac- 
tice. Words do have epistemological status in Bourdieu’s would-be theory.255 
In response to these remarks, it is worth reemphasizing that my article is not 
supposed to  be  a  summary  of  Bourdieu’s  writings on  language  based  on  a mere 
 
 paraphrasing exercise. Description, whether it is textually or  empirically  informed, 
is at best the pre-level of science. Analysis, whether it is meant to be interpretive     
or explanatory, is embedded in the purposive and creative spirit of science. Cer- 
tainly, one may doubt whether or not the terminology proposed in my article is  
useful for Bourdieusian studies of language. The point is not, however, whether I 
made some of these terms up or whether they were employed by  the master him-  
self; rather, the point is to contribute to a more insightful understanding of lan-  
guage. 
Furthermore, I should clarify that I do mean “reflections” (referring to thor-   
ough and critical thought processes); I do mean “conditions” (understood as a set     
of elements underlying a particular mode of activity or being); I do mean 
“unavoidable” (as in inevitable); I do mean “real” (as in existing or occurring in 
actuality), but I do not mean “realist” (as in the sense of the epistemological or 
philosophical doctrine); and I do mean “situation” (describing a set of circum- 
stances), rather than “event” (designating a happening or  an occurrence).  Grenfell  
is right to state that these are not merely semantic points raised by “a pedant”256. 
Instead of questioning my choice of words, it would have been useful if he had 
explained why and to what extent these terms  may  not  be  appropriate  and  on 
what grounds his own conceptual tools can be considered more suitable. 
(4) The charge of desocialization: In Grenfell’s argument, this problem comprises 
the following interrelated dimensions: (a) “the social”, (b) “the ontological”, (c)   
“the methodological”, (d) “the empirical” and (e) “the sociological”. The significance 
of these dimensions is reflected in the following aphoristic statements: 
 
(a) For Bourdieu, language is social.257 
(b) For Bourdieu, what is epistemological is ontological——the two are co-termi- 
nus.258 
My point is that Susen’s list of presuppositions […] seems to imply a claim to 
ontological status which asserts (theoretical) significance, whilst what  we  
need is to think more in terms of their (practical) adaptability and applicabil- 
ity.259 
(c) […] I would argue that the main challenge of a Bourdieusian approach to 
language is now methodological, rather than epistemological […].260 
(d) Bourdieu, of course, always asserted that he never theorized as such and, 
indeed, as above, I would side with him in  arguing  that  much  of  his so- 
called theory was derived from empirical engagement.
261
 
In what sense are they “unavoidable”? Are they logically necessitated by 
empirical data? The terms on the list may represent a useful range of episte- 
mological dimensions to language but seem to lack practical (praxis/praxeo- 
logical) usefulness from a methodological, empirical point of view for  the 
study  of language.
262
 
Thus, I have argued the following: it is necessary to  be  terminologically 
ascetic;  to  not  use  more  terms  than  is  necessary; it is necessary to use only 
 
 those logically necessitated by the data; it is necessary to avoid theory for 
theory’s sake […].263 
(e) […] it would seem impossible to dissociate his sociology from his philosophy 
because of Bourdieu’s own  epistemological foundations  to  what  he  means 
by  structure […].264 
I have always thought that Bourdieu is best described as a “social philoso- 
pher”. It follows from all this that there is a philosophy of language in Bour- 




(a) Given his relationalist conception of reality, it is true that Bourdieu studies 
both foundational and ephemeral aspects of the human world  in  terms  of  their 
social constitution. It is far from clear, however, what is to be learned from Gren- 
fell’s assertion that, “[f]or Bourdieu, language is social”266. Such a statement is lit-  
tle more perceptive than the affirmation that Bourdieu was a sociologist. More 
importantly, the fact that, from a Bourdieusian perspective, language is relationally 
constructed does not mean that it cannot have several socio-ontological features, 
which are, by definition, built into particular aspects of human coexistence. 
(b) Tying in with the previous point, it is not obvious what is to be gained     
from the unsubstantiated assertion that, “[f]or Bourdieu, what is epistemological       
is ontological——the two are co-terminus”267.  In  fact,  the  opposite  is  true:  they 
are not co-terminus. Even if we concede that there is an epistemological tension 
between sociological constructivism and epistemological realism in Bourdieu’s 
writings268, it is erroneous to make the unsubstantiated claim that the terms 
“epistemological” and “ontological” can be used interchangeably, or that they are 
conceptually or empirically interdependent. There is no knowledge without being,  
but there is being without knowledge. Put philosophically, there are no episte- 
mologies without real or imagined ontologies, but there are ontologies without 
epistemologies. From a phenomenological point of view, reality exists for us only 
insofar as  we experience,  interact  with and  reflect  upon it.  From  a realist  point  
of view, reality exists in itself, regardless of our experiences of, interactions with   
and reflections upon it. Notwithstanding the question of whether or not con- 
structivism and realism can be reconciled, “knowledge about reality” (on the epis- 
temological level) and the “existence of reality” (on the ontological level) are not    
the  same thing. 
(c) Grenfell states that he “would argue that the main challenge of a 
Bourdieusian approach to language is now methodological, rather than epistemo- 
logical”269. The problem with this contention,  however,  is  not  only  that  the  
author fails to substantiate its validity on the basis of discursive or substantive 
evidence, but also that his  plea  “for  method”,  legitimate  as  it  may  be,  should  
not be regarded as antithetical to a plea “for knowledge”. Language is both the      
key tool by  which we organize our encounter with reality methodologically and     
the main vehicle through which we raise validity claims about reality epistemolog- 
 
 ically. Yet, what is more significant with regard to Grenfell’s aforementioned 
comment is that, by definition, every  study of language is semantically organized.  
In other words, the study of language occurs, both methodologically and episte- 
mologically, through language. In brief, Grenfell misses the point when opposing   
the methodological and epistemological dimensions of  the  study  of  language to 
one  another. 
(d) One need only read Pascalian meditations270 to realize that it is nonsense to 
assume that Bourdieu “never theorized as such”271. Undoubtedly, Bourdieu’s entire 
oeuvre is marked by a strong commitment to the view that “research  without the-  
ory is blind, and theory without research is empty”272. Yet, this does not justify 
Grenfell’s short-sighted——and, once more, unsubstantiated——claim that Bourdieu 
“never theorized as such”273. On the contrary, as has been widely acknowledged by 
both  his  sympathetic  and  his  unsympathetic  critics,  Bourdieu  has  made  several 
substantial theoretical contributions, notably to sociology, anthropology and cul- 
tural studies. To assert that we should “use only those [terms] logically necessitated 
by the data”274 means to subscribe to crude empiricism, a reductive methodological 
position to which Bourdieu was strongly and explicitly opposed.275 Surely, when 
reflecting upon the “unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation”276, as 
identified in my article, Grenfell plausibly questions their methodological useful- 
ness for the empirical study of language. Moreover, he is right to imply that I     
could have given empirical examples to demonstrate their relevance to the socio- 
logical examination of communicative processes. I must emphasize, however, that 
my article is not an empirical study but a theoretical attempt to shed light on the 
“unavoidable conditions of real speech”277. Grenfell does not give a single theoreti- 
cal, let alone empirical, example to demonstrate that even one of the conditions iden- 
tified in my article is not inherent in language. Perhaps, I should write a second 
article with abundant empirical examples to illustrate not only the in-built exis-  
tence but also the sociological relevance of the “unavoidable conditions of real 
speech”278. 
(e) I do not object to characterizing Bourdieu as a “social philosopher”279, nor 
do I disagree with Grenfell’s contention that, from a Bourdieusian point of view, it 
makes little sense “to dissociate sociology from philosophy”280. We need to admit, 
however, that, in practice, this is not what  happens. Disciplinary  boundaries are  
both imagined and real: they are imagined, in the sense that they are relatively arti- 
ficial, since academic scholars, consciously or unconsciously, draw upon knowledge 
generated under the umbrella of various disciplines; they are real, in the sense that 
they exist, both ideologically and institutionally, and, therefore, have a substantial 
impact upon the ways in which knowledge is generated in discipline-specific terms. 
Bourdieu, as a philosopher by training and a sociologist by choice, is widely per- 
ceived as the latter, rather than the former. Given his emphasis on the relational 
construction of human reality, sociology is his “house of being”. In fact, from a 
Bourdieusian perspective, sociology is to philosophy what science is to religion: “a 
threat to the self-declared ultimate authority of an arbitrary  historical  author-  
ity”281. Yet, this does not permit us to assume that——despite the global rise of 
 
 interdisciplinary research programmes——disciplinary boundaries have ceased to 
exist. Bourdieu’s works have become an essential part of almost every sociology 
curriculum around the world. How many philosophy curriculums on this planet 
include Bourdieu on the menu? The answer is as follows: remarkably few, if any.  
We may not like it, but philosophy remains to a large extent——that is, both insti- 
tutionally and intellectually——dissociated from sociology. 
 
Bryan  S. Turner 
In his insightful article “Pierre Bourdieu and public liturgies”282, Bryan S. Turner 
draws our attention to two aspects of language which,  he  believes,  are  often 
ignored by sociologists: its historical and its performative dimensions. It goes with- 
out saying that I am flattered by Turner’s suggestion that “we should congratulate 
Simon Susen for providing us with a systematic account of what the sociology of 
language entails and inter alia for offering a valuable interrogation of the underde- 
veloped position of language in Pierre Bourdieu’s general sociology”283. As should 
be clear to the reader, Turner and I share a number of key assumptions about the 
nature of language, perhaps most importantly——as  he himself stresses——in  
regard to the “sociality”284 of language. Turner’s contribution is a breath of fresh air. 
He centres his analysis directly upon Bourdieu’s writings and gives a balanced 
account of the latter’s ability to provide an insightful approach to the sociological 
study of language. Instead of recapitulating the numerous points on which Turner 
and I concur, let me focus on five central issues on which we disagree. 
(1) Turner frets about “the relative neglect of language in contemporary social 
theory”285, complaining that it has been “relegated to the margins of social the- 
ory”286. As anyone familiar with developments in intellectual thought over the past 
one hundred years will be able to confirm, however, language has been a central 
concern in twentieth-century social theory, as reflected in the paradigmatic impact   
of different versions of the “linguistic turn”287. It is ironic that Turner asserts there  
has been “too little” emphasis on language in contemporary social theory, whereas 
Inglis, in his commentary, affirms there has been far “too much” of  a preoccupa-  
tion with it, leading to the “fetishization of language” in much of modern intellec- 
tual thought. One does not have to go as far as Inglis, but there is corroborative 
evidence to demonstrate that the thorough engagement with language has been 
crucial to recent developments in social theory in particular and modern intellec-  
tual thought in general (notably in the works of  Wittgenstein,  Heidegger,  Gad- 
amer, Ricœur, Habermas and Bourdieu——to mention only a  few  examples).  In 
fact, the impact of this paradigmatic focus has been sufficiently significant to shape 
current debates in such a way that a wide range of theoretical approaches——as 
diverse as structuralism, post-structuralism, post-modernism, critical realism and 
critical theory——now take language-theoretic concerns remarkably seriously. 
(2) Turner alleges that the most influential approaches in the sociology of lan- 
guage tend to be overly micro-oriented. Following this line of argument, he con- 
tends   that   “[w]e   may   reasonably   claim   that   sociologists   have   concentrated 
 
 primarily on what I may call the spontaneous eruption of language in face-to-face 
communication”288. On this account, sociology has hosted “typically the study of 
language as it is deployed in everyday situations as the primary medium of commu- 
nication”289. In this regard, Turner’s reference to “conversational analysis, which 
looks at the conventions of language use in interactional settings, such as turn tak-  
ing and sequential placement”290 is largely persuasive. His remarks on “the study of 
restricted codes in a lower-class milieu by Basil Bernstein”291, however, are much 
less convincing, as the main purpose of class-focused approaches to language is to 
make sense of the ways in which macro-social structures impact upon everyday lan- 
guage use, particularly in terms of people’s capacity to master the rules of seman- 
tics, syntax, phonetics and pragmatics. Yet, even more  significant  is  Turner’s  
failure to recognize that macro-oriented versions of language-theoretic and commu- 
nication-theoretic approaches in sociology have been no less influential than their 
micro-oriented counterparts. Arguably, the most prominent examples of these 
frameworks have sought to bridge the gap between micro- and macro-levels of 
analysis, as illustrated in the works of Bourdieu (habitus and field) and Habermas 
(lifeworld and system). In short, in contemporary sociology, language is both a 
micro-theoretic and a macro-theoretic object of study. 
(3) Turner maintains that “in modern society we no longer easily recognize the 
role of liturgies in public life”292. Given that, in the capitalist era, “the public sphere 
has been severely eroded by the market”293, “we have only a weak notion of both secu- 
lar and religious liturgies”294 and, consequently, “we no longer possess a vivid sense of 
that ensemble of public duties that have to be performed by citizens in a structured 
calendar of activities”295. This, he suggests, is sociologically significant in that “[t]he 
transformation of the public sphere by the modern technology of the media has largely 
robbed us of the experience of collective liturgies employing a shared language in a ritual 
context”296. I shall make three straightforward points in response to this concern: 
(a) Most worryingly, Turner’s account is suspiciously close to anti-modern views 
based on conservative romanticism à la Heidegger, implying that traditional  
and community-based societies are essentially more “human” social settings 
than post-traditional and highly differentiated ones. Yet, such a romanticiza- 
tion of premodern societies, expressed in the demonization of systemically 
differentiated and technologically advanced life forms, involves the risk of 
making the sociologically reductive, and politically reactionary, claim that the 
traditional “cult of community” is no less problematic than  the  post-tradi- 
tional  “cult of  the individual”. 
(b) Rather than simply depriving us of collective experiences and shared lan- 
guages, the media——including the mass media and social media——have con- 
tributed not only to the colonization of the public sphere by group-specific 
economic and political interests, but also to their pluralization and democrati- 
zation in accordance with universal human interests.297 
(c) We must not forget that a strong and omnipresent public sphere, sustained 
through the celebration of both secular and religious liturgies, is not a positive 
 
 social phenomenon in itself. Totalitarian societies——notably fascist and state- 
communist ones——tend to be characterized by the presence of highly ritual- 
ized public performances and languages; their collectivist nature,  however, 
does not convert them into desirable and legitimate arenas of intersubjective 
encounters. Public spheres need to contain universally empowering normative 
ingredients——such as democracy, dialogue, discourse and freedom of 
expression——in order to qualify as progressive and emancipatory realms of 
human  interaction. 
(4) Turner contends that two aspects of my argument need to be elaborated 
further: (a) the “inescapable historical character of language”298 and (b) “the ritual  
of public events”299. The first dimension refers to “its development through time as 
the common culture of a people”300, whereas the second element requires us to  
reflect upon “language-as-performance”301 in the context of particular interactional 
settings. Turner affirms that “we can  take  [his]  commentary  on  both  Bourdieu 
and Susen as a plea for the comparative and historical study of language as an insti- 
tution that forms the foundation of the collective conscience and the shared memory 
of societies”302. In response to this proposition, it is worth pointing out that, as 
elucidated in my article, in Bourdieu’s work there  is a  strong  concern with  both  
the historical and the performative aspects of language. (a) With regard to its his- 
torical dimensions, Bourdieu emphasizes the doxic nature of linguistically consti- 
tuted and contextually mobilized background assumptions, reflecting an analytical 
focus he borrows from hermeneutics. (b) With regard to its performative dimen- 
sions, Bourdieu stresses the practical and context-specific nature of language, nota- 
bly in terms of its creative capacity to shape, and its  adaptive  capacity  to  be  
shaped by, field-specific interactional settings. By no means  do Bourdieu and  I  
deny that, as Turner puts it, language constitutes “a major institution that is essen-  
tial for the conduct of social life in the public domain”303, and by no means do         
we reduce language to a “spontaneous […] feature of interaction in  everyday  
life”304. On the contrary, one of the principal aims of the Bourdieusian study of 
language is to shed light on its socio-historical and socio-performative functions at 
three essential levels: at the micro-level of the individual, at the meso-level of com- 
munity and at the macro-level of society. 
(5) As Bourdieu’s eclectic  writings demonstrate, it  is not true  that he had “little 
understanding of the role of religion in the performance of social life, let alone the place 
of religion in creating national consciousness”305, as argued by Turner. One may have 
good reason to come to the conclusion that Bourdieu failed to make a substantial 
contribution to the sociology of religion.306 Yet, in accordance with the Weberian  
and Durkheimian spirit underlying large parts of his writings, his sensibility towards 
the bonding function of religion307 should not be underestimated, just as his critical 
awareness of the normalizing function of national languages——based on processes  
of standardization, officialization and institutionalization——needs to be taken ser- 
iously.308 Thus, Turner’s assertion that, essentially, there is “too much Weber” and 
“not enough  Durkheim”  in  Bourdieu and  that,  consequently,  he  “has  less  to say 
 
 about the role of language in expressing and shaping the sentiments and conscious- 
ness of a society”309 is questionable——to say the least. From a Bourdieusian 
perspective, it is the relationship between languages and social fields which permits 
us to understand both the bonding and the segregating functions of symbolic power. 
Hence, “national consciousness” and “religious consciousness”, both of which are 
embedded in and reproduced through language, are only two amongst many other 
field-specific forms of doxa. 
 
Lisa Adkins 
In her excellent and challenging commentary “Ontological Bourdieu? A reply to 
Simon Susen”310, Lisa Adkins questions the validity of my “ontological” interpreta- 
tion of Bourdieu’s conception of language. As she forcefully states in her conclu- 
sion, her three lines of critique can be described as follows: 
 
first, the critique of the idea of language as meaning-bearing; second, the critique of the 
idea of the ontological as a site or source of transcendence and resistance; and, third, the 
critique of the idea of subjective experience as constructed through linguistic catego- 
ries——are  all hard-wired to this transformation.311 
Whilst I believe that Adkins demonstrates that we need to push my argument 
further,  it seems to me that some of her criticisms  are based on a misinterpreta-   
tion of key elements underlying my analysis. Let me try to respond to her charges 
one  by one. 
(1) “Language as meaning-bearing”: This point of criticism boils down to the 
tension between two——seemingly opposed——theoretical positions. On the one 
hand, there is the classical hermeneutic position312, which stresses that, given “that 
language allows for the symbolic mediation of reality, we need to account for the 
socio-ontological centrality of everyday hermeneutics”313. This view is synthesized  
in the Gadamerian contention, eloquently summarized by William Outhwaite, that 
“[h]ermeneutics is universal because understanding is the fundamental way  in  
which human beings participate in the world”314. On the other hand, there is the post-
hermeneutic position315, which suggests that, insofar as “human meaning and 
interpretation have reached a limit point in the contemporary  present”316, we  need  
to face up to the fact “that participation in the world is increasingly beyond mean-  
ing and understanding”317. This perspective is expressed in the neo-vitalist  asser-  
tion that, over the past few decades, we have been witnessing “a historical shift in 
sociality”318, which has profound implications for contemporary sociology. 
According to Adkins, this transition obliges us to revise traditional conceptions of 
social existence, based on “a logic of structure and action”319 and “organized  
through human consciousness”320, and to develop new approaches to sociality, 
“operating through a logic of affective modulation, a modulation arranged through     
a post-human ontology of matter”321. 
Adkins’s  anti-rationalist  line  of  critique  is  founded  (a)  on  the philosophical 
argument  that  “sociality  operates  not  through  meaning  but  through  sensation or 
 
 affect”322, (b) on the sociological argument that the contemporary world is charac- 
terized by “the emergence of affect as a source of value, including economic 
value”323, and (c) on the methodological argument that, in light of the above, it is 
time to make a case  “for a reoriented sociology and especially for a sociology of   
the  sensate empirical”324. 
(a) In response to the philosophical argument, it is worth pointing out that I   
have never claimed that meaning is the only way in which human actors partici-   
pate in the world, nor have I ever denied the existence of non-linguistic sources or 
vehicles of meaning. Rather than opposing  meaning  and  sensation,  or  meaning 
and affect, to one another, I would insist that, in the human universe, they are 
inextricably interrelated. Indeed, I would go even further and suggest that emo- 
tions——such as love or hatred, sympathy or apathy, and empathy or indifference—
—can be much more powerful sources of meaning than reason.  The  constative, 
normative, expressive and communicative functions of language may enable us to 
interpret, justify, convey or share our sensations. This does not mean, however, that 
language permits us to control, let alone do away with, them. The existential search 
for meaning is vital to us not only because we are rational entities but also, perhaps 
more significantly, because we are emotional beings. 
(b) In response to the sociological argument, I wonder why we should be 
inclined to think that affects and sensations are more powerful in the contempo-   
rary era than in previous epochs. Is the “background of a non-hermeneutic affec-   
tive sociality”325, to which Adkins refers in her commentary, really such a new and 
unprecedented interactional scenario? Owing to their scepticism towards “ontologi- 
cal” or “transcendental” claims about the nature of the human condition, post- 
structuralist thinkers, such as Adkins, are reluctant to accept that the “affective or 
vitalist (or, as it is also sometimes termed, intensive) character”326  of sociality is     
an integral feature not only of “contemporary life”327  but also, more fundamen-   
tally, of human coexistence. 
(c) In response to the methodological argument, it seems to me that Adkins is 
entirely right to imply that, for far too long, sociology has remained trapped in        
the stifling dichotomies of modern intellectual thought, such as the rational versus  
the emotional, the conceptual versus the empirical, the individual versus the social, 
and the cultural versus the natural——to mention only a few of them. Her plea for 
a “sociology of the sensate empirical”328, however,  can  be  a  fruitful  way  of break- 
ing out of the presuppositional straitjackets of Enlightenment thought only to the 
extent that it recognizes the emancipatory potential of communicative reason. For,   
as humans, we are equipped with the species-constitutive capacity  to shape our    
own destiny by raising reflexive——that is, communicatively negotiated and discur- 
sively tested——claims to validity. The idea of “a post-human ontology of mat-  
ter”329   may  sound  intellectually   challenging  and  cutting-edge.   The   question of 
whether or not we are able to live in a world without anthropological invariants, 
however, is an entirely different matter. Even if we reject the scientistic spirit of  
early modern thought, we should be careful not to convert sociology into an eso-  
teric enterprise of vitalist astrology. 
 
 (2) “The ontological as a site or source of transcendence and resistance”: Adkins 
states that I put forward “an ontological conception of language”330, in order to 
defend the notion that empowering anthropological capacities——such as our com- 
municative competence——enable us “to overcome the material and symbolic dis- 
tance generated by social asymmetries”331. Moreover, she contends that I position 
“the ontological in regard to language not only as a potential source of transcen- 
dence for normative positioning across and within social fields, but also as a source  
of potential resistance to domination”332. According to Adkins, this——arguably old- 
fashioned——view  “is tied to a model of social formation whose relevance may   
now be exhausted”333, since we have entered an era in which “domination operates 
ontologically”334 and in which “life and domination can no longer be easily differ- 
entiated”335. In the current age, she affirms, “the ontological […] is part of the      
very apparatus of domination”336, imposing its ubiquity “through a post-human 
ontology  of  human matter”337. 
Adkins’s anti-essentialist line of critique is based (a) on the philosophical argu- 
ment that there is nothing intrinsically emancipatory about ontologies, (b) on the 
sociological argument that, in the contemporary world, the ontological and the non-
ontological have become indistinguishable, and (c) on the methodological argument 
that, as a consequence, we should embrace a post-ontological social science. 
(a) In response to the philosophical argument, it is crucial to define the term 
“ontological”. Similar to  other key  concepts in  intellectual  thought, “ontological” 
is not “a self-evident sociological category”338; this does not mean, however, that it 
cannot be defined. I cannot speak on behalf of Adkins, but in my article the con-  
cept “ontological” refers to any kind of dimension worth describing as a form of 
existence. Thus, the term “socio-ontological” designates any aspect of reality which 
forms part of human coexistence. The question of what distinguishes existence from 
non-existence, or the ontological from the non-ontological, is a different matter.    
Yet, by no means have I ever sought to suggest that “the ontological” has a norma- 
tive nature in itself, let alone an emancipatory potential, which is built into the 
authenticity of being. There is nothing intrinsically normative, let alone positive, 
about being, nor is a prescriptive “ought-to-be” inherent in a descriptive “is”.  If  
there is anything normative about our “being in the world” (Dasein), it is the fact  
that our existence is characterized by both bright and dark sides, by both “being   
with one another” (Miteinandersein) and “being against one another” (Gegen- 
einandersein), by both cooperation and competition, by both subversion and com- 
pliance, in short, by tension-laden forces and interests. 
(b) In response to the sociological argument, it seems to me that, although it    
has become fashionable to proclaim that, in late modern or post-modern societies, 
traditional boundaries are increasingly blurred, we need to recognize that the con- 
ceptual distinction between “the ontological” and “the non-ontological” is far from 
obsolete. The point is not to suggest that language constitutes an ahistorical force 
based on timeless properties, which can be abstracted from the particular historical 
contexts in which symbolic resources are mobilized by meaning-producing actors. 
 
 Rather, the point is to acknowledge that all languages, whilst they emerge and 
flourish in specific social settings, share a number of universal features——that is, 
several attributes which transcend the historical specificity of the relationally 
constructed contexts in which they are embedded. If, as I have sought to demon- 
strate in my article, this is the case, then these universal features of language are    
not, as Adkins implies, “tied to a model of social formation”339, but, on the con- 
trary, they are integral to linguistically mediated engagements with reality in all 
social formations. 
(c) In response to the methodological argument, it seems to me that the very   
idea of a post-ontological social science is a contradiction in terms. If science is not 
concerned with being, or with different forms of being, then it ends up confining 
itself to the interpretive task of deciphering appearances which have no back-  
ground realities. Surely, we have every reason to believe that the natural sciences  
and the social sciences require profoundly different methodologies,  since  they  
study fundamentally different ontologies. Vitalist scholars may argue that the natu- 
ral world of objectivity and the social world of normativity may have much more     
in common than has been widely assumed by  Enlightenment-inspired  thinkers.  
Even if, however, the boundaries between natural and social realms are increasingly 
blurred, there is no human existence without human beings. Every really existing 
form of sociality constitutes a really existing  ontology. 
(3) “Subjective experience as constructed through linguistic categories”: Adkins’s 
main charge in this regard is that “Susen makes use of the notion of experience in      
a relatively unproblematic fashion, indeed, proceeds as if experience were a self-evi- 
dent sociological category, a substance simply filtered from the world via linguistic cat- 
egories”340. Neither in this article nor in any other study, however,  have  I  
suggested that experience is (a) an unproblematic or self-evident category, (b) a 
substance filtered from the world, or (c) an element which is exclusively con- 
structed via linguistic categories. On the contrary, to my mind, the point is to 
demonstrate that experience is (a) a foundational, yet controversial, category in the 
humanities and social sciences, (b) a filtering process, rather than a filtered sub- 
stance, allowing for our bodily immersion in and engagement with reality, and (c)   
an element which contains various non-linguistic dimensions.341 
Adkins’s anti-hermeneutic line of critique hinges (a) on the philosophical argu- 
ment that various constitutive aspects of experience “may be beyond the reach of 
language”342, (b) on the sociological argument that, in the contemporary world, the 
non-linguistic dimensions of experience have been intensified  due  to  the rise  of 
“an affective or vitalist sociality”343, and (c) on the methodological argument that  
this societal transition process “demands a thoroughgoing rethinking of the rela- 
tionships between language, experience and sociality”344, leading to the develop- 
ment of a post-empiricist “sociology of the sensate empirical”345. 
(a) In response to the philosophical argument, I must stress that I have never 
maintained that every experience is filtered, let alone constructed, through linguis-  
tic categories. On the contrary, the whole point of my critique of “linguistic ideal- 
ism”346 is to challenge the reductive view that “language is all there is for us” and 
 
 thereby resist the temptation to portray the human “house of being” as the “house     
of language”. As proposed in a previous study347, we can identify at least five socio-
ontological foundations: labour, language, culture, desire and experience. (i)  As 
working beings, we are purposive, cooperative, creative and socio-productive 
entities. (ii) As linguistic beings, we are assertive, normative, expressive and socio-
contemplative entities. (iii) As cultural beings, we are connective, collective, 
individuative and socio-constructive entities. (iv) As longing beings, we are inten- 
tional, coprojective, imaginative and socio-utopian entities. (v) As experiential 
beings, we are objective, intersubjective, subjective and immersive entities. Adkins  
is unlikely to sympathize with the foundationalist spirit underlying this five-dimen- 
sional framework. Whatever one makes of this model, however, it illustrates that I 
conceive of experience as a multi-layered process, which is irreducible to a one- 
dimensional engagement with reality, let alone to a linguistically structured sub- 
stance. We do experience language, and our experiences of reality are to a large 
extent mediated by language, but this does not mean that all aspects of our experi- 
ence are “constructed through linguistic categories”348. 
(b) In response to the sociological argument, it seems worth stressing  that, 
whilst I agree with Adkin’s contention that “sensations and affects may be beyond 
the reach of language”349, I disagree with her  assertion  that  in  contemporary  
“social formations”350 this is more evident than in previous ones. As she accurately 
points out, “the operations of meaning and understanding are in some way now   
more mediated, constrained or even colonized or hollowed out by […] powerful 
external social forces, for instance, the force of social fields or rule and resource 
sets”351. Habermas has famously described this process as the “colonization of the 
lifeworld”352, and Bourdieu’s analysis of power-laden social fields is also useful in 
this respect. Even if, following Adkins and other critical commentators, we are 
willing to concede that recent decades have been marked by “a thoroughgoing 
transformation of sociality”353, this does not mean that the latest developments have 
led to a complete disentanglement of experience and language. Certainly, any kind  
of profound social transformation “demands a rethinking of  human  experi-  
ence”354, because the existential conditions of our involvement in the world change  
in relation to the material and symbolic changes by which we are surrounded. It 
remains to be seen whether or not the concept of “unexperience”355 may be 
enlightening in this regard. Yet, human forms of sociality have always had, and     
will always continue to have, a deeply “affective and vitalist character”356, because 
human experiences have always been, and will always remain, embodied processes. 
(c) In response to the methodological argument, we have to be careful not to fall 
into the routine of advocating new paradigmatic “turns” every decade or so, just for 
the sake of demonstrating that sociology is capable of developing at the same pace as 
society itself. Indubitably, the various “linguistic turns” which have been announced 
over the past decades are fraught with difficulties, notably due to their tendency to 
reduce the human engagement with reality to an encounter with linguisticality. The 
multiple recent paradigmatic pleas——for a “vitalist turn”, “affective turn”, “post- 
ontological  turn” or  “(post)empirical  turn”——are  by  no  means  less problematic, 
 
 however, to the extent that they ignore the species-distinctive features of human soci- 
ality, one of which is communicative rationality. Of course, there is no point in 
relapsing into the habit of endorsing abstract conceptions of quasi-disembodied and 
rational subjects, since such an endeavour would lead to the revival of an anthropo- 
centric, positivist and empiricist sociology. Yet, it seems to me that there is little 
point in proclaiming the arrival of “a post-hermeneutic sensate sociology”357, if 
understood as a paradigmatic venture in which language and rationality are  
conceived of as peripheral, rather than foundational, elements of human sociality. 
Instead  of  opposing  an  “ontological  Bourdieu”  to  a  “sociological  Bourdieu”,  




In his stimulating commentary, entitled “Unavoidable idealizations and the reality of  
symbolic  power”358,  Hans-Herbert  Ko¨gler  defends  the  paradigmatic  significance of 
the study of language in Bourdieu’s writings. It is very kind of him to suggest   that 
“Simon Susen does a formidable and impressive job of unearthing the largely 
implicit ontology of Pierre Bourdieu’s account of linguistic practices”359 and that 
“[h]is encyclopedic gaze allows him to discern 10 essential features of Bourdieu’s 
conception of language”360. Above all, I am grateful for his sympathetic assessment 
that, “[a]fter Susen’s analysis, there can be no doubt about the centrality of lan-  
guage for Bourdieu’s reconstruction of practice”361. As should be clear to anyone 
who has read both my article  and Ko¨gler’s constructive commentary, there  are far 
more points on which we concur than issues on which we disagree. Rather than 
focusing upon our various areas of consensus, I  shall use this opportunity to  take   
on the more challenging task of reflecting upon some key sources of controversy. 
(1) It seems to me that Ko¨gler has a tendency to underestimate the sociological 
significance of both non-linguistic experiences of reality and non-linguistic sources of 
meaning. With regard to the former, this tendency manifests itself in statements   
such as the following: 
 
I take this to mean that language constitutes, in some respect, an insurmountable media- 
tion of our reality and its understanding and that, furthermore, we can call this form of 
unavoidability “transcendental” in the sense that it allows for the cognitive experience of 
social reality.362 
With regard to the latter, this tendency is expressed in assertions such as the 
following: 
[…] we need language to engage meaningfully with the world […].363 
Ko¨gler’s tendency to privilege linguistic over non-linguistic experiences of reality 
and sources of meaning is ironic in that one of his main ambitions is to expose the 
flaws of hermeneutic idealism.   Yet, he does not explicitly acknowledge the fact that 
 
 there are several non-linguistic ways of relating and attributing meaning  to  the 
world, notably through affects, emotions and intuitions, which play a pivotal role   
not only in embodied, and to a large extent nonverbal,  practices  of everyday life,  
but also in diverse forms of artistic expression, which are arguably no less signifi- 
cant than language in shaping the species-constitutive elements of human existence. 
(2) In  addition  to  giving  the  impression  of  playing  into  the  hands of herme- 
neutic idealism by privileging “internal semantic assumptions of the respective 
fields”364  over  bodily  non-semantic  practices,  Ko¨gler  unwittingly  subscribes  to  the 
fatalistic fallacy of essentializing processes of social distinction. This is, perhaps most 
clearly, discernible in the following passage: 
 
The reality of linguistic world-disclosure is always already structured and permanently 
permeated by a social logic of distinction that puts one’s socio-cultural standing at the 
core of a competitive and strategic world.365 
Contentions of this kind give the misleading impression that processes of social 
distinction are quasi-naturally built into the human condition and that, conse-  
quently, any form of world-disclosure is always already impregnated with a strati- 
fying logic. The whole point of Bourdieu’s relational approach, however, is to 
demonstrate that vertical modes of social organization, sustained by an unequal 
distribution of material and symbolic resources, are always relatively arbitrary and 
contingent upon the conditions of production  in  particular  interactional  settings, 
that is, in idiosyncratic social fields. As reflexive sociologists, we need to be critical 
of both “the socialization of the natural” and “the naturalization of the social”.366 
(3) To my mind, Ko¨gler presents us with an overly sociologistic reading of Bour- 
dieu’s conception of language. To be sure, I share Ko¨gler’s skilfully presented critique 
of “three hermeneutic illusions”: the “illusion of unmediated open dialogue”367, the 
“illusion of trans-social meaning”368 and the “illusion of representational reference”369. 
What is problematic in this context, however, is the following claim: 
 
He [Bourdieu] does not consider […] that the linguistic mediation of reality would be 
able to constitute  its own ontological force and that it could amount to a mediated   
sphere of transcendence in which oppositional forms of social agency may emerge.370 
As exemplified in the above passage, Ko¨gler underestimates the extent to which 
Bourdieu considers the linguistic mediation of reality as a relatively autonomous 
affair. Yet, the relative autonomy of symbolic forms is one of the key concerns in 
Bourdieu’s critical analysis of language.371 From a Bourdieusian perspective, 
linguistic practices cannot be dissociated from the field-specific contexts in which 
they are embedded. This does not mean, though, that language cannot function as a 
discursive driving force of “oppositional forms of social agency”372. Bourdieu’s 
emphasis on the sociological significance of heterodox, and hence subversive, lin- 
guistic discourses suggests the opposite is true. It is in this light that we need to 
assess  the  validity  of  one  of  Ko¨gler’s  boldest  assertions:  “Bourdieu’s  weakness–– 
namely his lack of a conceptually carved out sphere of autonomous linguistic under- 
standing——constitutes  his  very  strength”373.   If humans were  not  bestowed with 
 
 cognitive autonomy derived from linguistic reflexivity, then there would  be  no 
room for critical, and potentially subversive, agency in field-differentiated realities. 
(4) I have some reservations about Ko¨gler’s account of the relationship between 
language and power. One problem in this regard is that he pays  insufficient  
attention to social mechanisms of misrecognition, as illustrated in the following 
contention: 
 
Therefore, agents encounter one another within a socially defined space in which the 
epistemic authority of the other is inextricably intertwined with the socially granted 
authority of the other as such-and-such a socially recognized speaker.374 
The critical study of the relationship between validity and legitimacy375 reveals 
that, just as the presence of epistemic authority is intimately interrelated with the 
access to social authority, the lack of the former is often a result of the absence of 
the  latter.  Of  course,  Ko¨gler  is  aware  of  the  significance  of  relationally  constituted 
mechanisms of misrecognition,  but in his  commentary these dynamics  play  at best 
a marginal role, when in fact processes of exclusion are a constitutive feature of 
stratified societies. 
(5) Crucial  to  Ko¨gler’s  reconstruction  of  linguistic  practices  is  his  mission  to 
overcome the antinomy between hermeneutic idealism and structuralist sociologism. 
He poignantly describes this ambition——which he shares not only  with  me  but 
also, more importantly, with Bourdieu——as the attempt to avoid falling into “the  
trap between the Scylla of hermeneutic idealism and the Charybdis of sociological 
power-reductionism”376. This issue ties in with one of Ko¨gler’s core concerns, which 
is also central to the argument developed in my article: namely, to think not only  
with and against Bourdieu, and not only with and against Habermas, but also with 
and against Bourdieu through Habermas, as well as with and against Habermas 
through Bourdieu. As pointed out by Outhwaite and myself, rather than simply 
opposing their approaches to one another, the more fruitful challenge consists in 
cross-fertilizing them by demonstrating that they constitute two complementary 
theoretical frameworks.377 In short, there is substantial “common  ground”378  
between Habermas and Bourdieu, and in this sense “a fully normative view and a 
fully power-analytic view”379 are by no means mutually exclusive. 
Defending  Habermas,  Ko¨gler  legitimately  insists  that,  given  its  emphasis  on 
intersubjective practices in human lifeworlds, the theory of communicative action 
rejects “a simple opposition between situated discourse and ahistorical reason”380. 
Criticizing  Bourdieu,  Ko¨gler  makes  the  more  controversial  claim  that,  “when  Bo- 
urdieu suggests that communication rarely functions as a pure instrument of co- 
mmunication, he is trivially right, but misses the point”381. The previous two 
reflections, as well as discourse-ethical assertions such as “reasons are meant to be 
valid as such”382, may give the impression that Ko¨gler’s own perspective is primar- 
ily Habermasian and only secondarily Bourdieusian. In any case, it seems to me that 
Ko¨gler puts his finger on a curious paradox which lies at the heart of my article: 
 
 […] it is […] the apparent conflict of rejecting Habermas repeatedly, while nevertheless 
endorsing seemingly Habermasian intuitions in Susen’s counter-critique of Bourdieu,  
that forces us to take a closer  look.383 
However one may seek to cross-fertilize Bourdieusian  and  Habermasian  
insights, such an endeavour obliges us to face up to “the intersection of social 
situatedness and linguistic mediation”384. Yet, rather than focusing exclusively on  
the relationship between “idealization”385 processes,  based  on  communicative 
action, and “power maximization”386 dynamics, sustained by strategic action, a more   
interesting   point   of   controversy   is   what   Ko¨gler   astutely   refers   to   as “the 
multifunctionality of speech”387. Some commentators will find it difficult to share  
Ko¨gler’s  communication-theoretic  assumption  that  “social  fields  can  ‘function’ 
only via their mediation through language”388, or my universalist assertion   that, as a 
foundational realm of human life, the linguistic field “constitutes a civilizational 
ensemble of relationally structured conditions the existence of which is necessary for 
the emergence of social order”389. Undoubtedly, the study of “the multifunctionality 
of speech”390  remains a major source of controversy.  What are  the main functions 
of language? The answer my article offers to this question is that the key functions of 
language are inextricably linked to the principal features of language. On this view, 
the assertive, normative, expressive and communicative functions of language cannot 
be dissociated from its (1) social, (2) dialectical, (3) interpretive, (4) doxic, (5) 
discursive, (6) (de-)legitimizing, (7) ideological, (8) value-laden, (9) interest-laden 
and (10) power-laden characteristics. 
Rather than providing an exhaustive list of the multiple functions of language,  
however,  Ko¨gler  and  I  seem  to  agree  that  the  transcendentalist  investigation of  
symbolic  relations  is  worth  nothing  without  the  pragmatist  exploration  of the 
conditions of  their  real-world  unfolding.  Just  as  we  should  follow  the  late 
Wittgenstein in recognizing that the  meaning  of  a  word  is  defined  by  its  use, 
we should follow Bourdieu in acknowledging that the functions of linguistic 
resources cannot be dissociated from the social contexts in which they are mobilized.  
Ko¨gler  and  I  appear  to  be  united  in  this  mission.  To  accept,  then, that our 
task, as reflexive sociologists, is to examine “ce que parler veut dire”391 means to 
face up to the fact  that  “[t]here  is  […]  much  more  involved  in  speaking  than  
the  intent  to  communicate”392. 
 
David Inglis 
Anyone who has read the thought-provoking piece “Bourdieu, language and 
‘determinism’: A reply to Simon Susen”393  will comprehend why David Inglis is  
one of the most original, intellectually challenging and rhetorically skilled scholars  
in contemporary British sociology. Throughout his article, he makes numerous 
perceptive comments, for which I am extremely grateful. On the sympathetic side,  
he considers that I have “produced […] an even-handed account”394 and “a very fair-
minded   appraisal   of   Bourdieu’s   concerns   with  language”395,  based  on  “a 
 
 remarkably clear exposition”396. More significantly, we appear to agree that identi- 
fying the conditions underlying “the real speech situation, always and inevitably 
wrapped up in social power relations”397, is a worthwhile project. Further room      
for consensus is expressed in Inglis’s assertion that “Susen is correct to emphasize 
that Bourdieu’s understanding of language is primarily rooted in his account of  
power, domination and legitimacy”398. In addition, Inglis’s contextualizing remarks 
are cogent, notably his observation that, “[c]learly, Susen has not read Bourdieu   
with the aim of dethroning a dead king”399. 
Not everyone will share Inglis’s kind assessment that “[s]o logical and sys- 
tematic is Susen’s exposition and critique of Bourdieu’s understanding  of  lan-  
guage that it is certain to become the  definitive  piece  on  such  issues”400.  To  
learn, however, that Inglis  thinks  that  “[a]ny  reader  will  be  struck  by  the  
paper’s exceptionally comprehensive and lucid treatment of such matters”401 is 
obviously both rewarding and encouraging,  particularly  in  light  of  the  fact  that 
the literature on Bourdieu is characterized by a lack of attention to the explan-     
atory significance of the philosophical assumptions underpinning his writings on 
language. I am  honoured  by  Inglis’s  generous  concluding  statement,  according  
to which “Simon Susen has done the social theory field a great favour by exca-  
vating many of Bourdieu’s deepest assumptions in a manner no one has done 
before”402. 
As I hope will be apparent from these sympathetic  comments,  the  fact  that 
Inglis and I diverge on many counts should not distract from the reality that, in   
terms of the “big picture”, there is far more room for consensus than for disagree- 
ment between his and my reading of Bourdieu. Let me nevertheless try to address 
some of Inglis’s eloquently presented criticisms of my article. It seems to me that  
five charges are particularly worth discussing. 
(1) The overestimation and underestimation of Bourdieu’s insightfulness: This 
criticism is succinctly expressed in the following passage: 
 
Yet, I think Susen has overestimated Bourdieu and underestimated  him at the  same  
time. The really serious criticisms that could be made are left untouched, while the criti- 
cisms offered seem to me to be both unfair and rooted in some questionable assump- 
tions of their own. That such an acute thinker as  Susen  has  made  these  mistakes  
points to the fact that we  are dealing here not  with the idiosyncrasies  of  one paper  or 
its author, but rather with problematic yet unquestioned assumptions that plague the 
social-theoretical field, and related intellectual domains, at the present  time.403 
In response to this assessment, I shall make four straightforward points. 
(a) From a merely discursive angle, the accusation that I have both overestimated 
and underestimated Bourdieu may sound provocative and challenging.  In  
terms of substance, however, Inglis provides remarkably little, if any, convinc- 
ing textual evidence, based on Bourdieu’s own writings, in order to justify this 
fundamental allegation. 
(b) The charge that the genuinely substantial criticisms that  could  and  should 
have been launched against Bourdieu are ignored in my analysis is weakened 
 
 by the fact that, apart from the  claim  that  the  master’s  account  of  lan-  
guage lacks in originality, Inglis fails to specify what these areas of significant 
disapproval actually are. 
(c) By no means do I seek to suggest that my piece offers an in-all-respects- 
unprecedented, let alone exhaustive, account of Bourdieu’s conception of 
language. A closer, and slightly more systematic, consideration of my criti-    
cal reflections on Bourdieu’s perspective, however,  may  have  permitted  
Inglis to concede that some of the limitations and weaknesses discussed in      
my paper have  not  been  identified,  or  at  least  not  been  examined  from  
the same angle, in any previous studies. His binary notion of my purport-     
edly concurrent overestimation and underestimation of Bourdieu, however, 
gives a curiously reductive account of the multi-layered criticisms developed   
in  my article. 
(d) Perhaps unwittingly, Inglis portrays “the social-theoretical field”404 as a lar- 
gely homogenous realm inundated with a series of “problematic yet unques- 
tioned assumptions”405, as if all social theorists were singing from the same 
hymn sheet and subscribed to the same set of  paradigmatic presuppositions.   
As  Inglis  knows,  nothing  could  be  further   from   the   truth,   not   even 
with regard to the “Bourdieu is a determinist”406 thesis,  since  there  are  
various Bourdieusian and non-Bourdieusian scholars——Inglis being one of 
them——who  do not share this view. 
(2) The fetishization of language: Elaborating on this issue, Inglis affirms that 
“Susen has been too kind to Bourdieu”407 for overlooking the fact that “a focus on 
language——shared by Bourdieu and just about every other major social thinker of 
his time——is a peculiarly late twentieth-century fetish, but a fetish certainly not 
perceived as such by those in its grip”408. Four interrelated analytical levels, on  
which this allegation is based, are particularly important. 
(a) On the ontological level, it is a common feature of many twentieth-century 
philosophers, especially of those associated with the “linguistic turn”409, to 
share the foundationalist assumption that, owing to its “constitutive role in 
human life”410, “language [is] the root of  all human  existence”411. 
(b) On the methodological level, this paradigmatic obsession is, according to  
Inglis, reflected in the fact that “language’s place in human existence was 
drastically overestimated in the last fifty years or so, both by German-style 
communication philosophy and by French-style semiotic thinking”412, as 
epitomized in “the fetishization of Wittgenstein”413 and the increasing popu- 
larity of “the widespread assumption that language was the  root of, and clue  
to, all things”414. On this account, rigorous social-scientific methods need to 
have a sophisticated language-theoretic orientation. 
(c) On the explanatory  level,  the  “linguistic  turn”  is  intimately  intertwined  
with the “cultural turn”, both of which are based on “a set of interlocking 
assumptions about the allegedly huge importance of language and its capac- 
ities  to  create  a  multiplicity  of  cultural  arbitraries”415.  As  maintained  by 
 
 Inglis, these  two  paradigmatic  transitions  do  not  only  go  hand-in-hand,  
but, in  addition,  they  are  “founded  on  a  set  of  erroneous  ideas  about  
what ‘culture’ and ‘nature’ are, with culture falsely being  seen  to  be  the  
driver of all things”416. 
(d) On the historical level, Inglis asserts that——in the future——the ontological, 
methodological and explanatory differences between seemingly irreconcilable 
(notably Bourdieusian, Habermasian and post-structuralist) approaches to 
language “will seem to be utterly trivial”417, not unlike “peas in a pod”418, 
whose elementary components are “uncomfortably close”419 to one another. 
In response to these critical considerations, I shall make four straightforward 
points. 
(a) In relation to the ontological level, it is worth pointing out that language   
does play a constitutive role in the construction of human life. This does not mean, 
though, that it necessarily deserves to be given a foundational status in philosophi- 
cal and sociological analysis. Inglis’s scepticism towards the fetishization of lan- 
guage in twentieth-century social philosophy is justified to the extent that we need   
to be suspicious of any form of “linguistic idealism” which reduces the complexi- 
ties of social realities to the symbolic realm of language. It is crucial to be critical     
of Zeitgeistsurfing, that is, of the opportunistic tendency to embrace, or even cele- 
brate,  a  set  of  paradigmatic  presuppositions  simply  because  they  are  a`  la  mode 
and, therefore, ensure that our epistemic claims to validity are imbued with the    
most lucrative intellectual currency allowing for the pursuit of symbolic profits. 
What is more constructive than articulating legitimate concerns about the episte- 
mological and moral fallacies of Zeitgeistsurfing, however, is to explore to what 
degree language can be regarded as one amongst other constitutive components,      
or even socio-ontological foundations, of human life. I have proposed a Grundriß     
of such a project elsewhere420; the  advantage of such a multidimensional approach  
to the social consists in the possibility of recognizing the vital role of language in   
the construction of human existence, whilst acknowledging that there are various 
other constitutive and irreducible elements which are no less essential to the 
unfolding of everyday life than its linguistic components. 
(b) In relation to the methodological level, it is worth remembering that the 
paradigmatic focus on language is not, as  Inglis  suggests,  a  late  twentieth-cen- 
tury phenomenon, but that it  began  in  the  early  twentieth  century,  inspired  by 
the writings of the early Wittgenstein  and  the  early  Heidegger,  although  their  
later works are arguably more important to the “linguistic turn” advocated by  
modern social philosophers. Strangely enough, Inglis, whilst rightly insisting on 
Wittgenstein’s indisputable influence,  omits  mentioning  Heidegger,  who——for  
the right or the wrong reasons——is, along with Wittgenstein, one of the most 
influential  twentieth-century  German-speaking  philosophers  of language. 
In addition, it is striking that Inglis, when objecting to the fetishization of 
language, fails to  contextualize  the  rise  of  the  “linguistic  turn”  in  relation  to  
the  Methodenstreit  (“methodological  dispute”).  One  of  the  main  reasons  for the 
 
 paradigmatic prioritization  of  language  in  the  twentieth  century  was  the  fact  
that philosophers  were  still  grappling  with  a  fundamental  question  (debated  
long before, during and even after the Methodenstreit): what, if anything, raises 
human beings above other entities? In response to this  anthropocentric enquiry, 
many different answers have been given: “reason” (Kant, Descartes); “mutual 
recognition” (Hegel, Honneth); “productive activity” (Marx); “consciousness” 
(Husserl); “the unconscious” (Freud,  Lacan);  “freedom”  (Sartre);  and,  last  but  
not least, “language” (Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricœur, Habermas).421 
Regardless of whether one considers the modern ambition to identify the species-
constitutive dimensions of human existence as a meaningful or pointless project, it 
seems to me that  Inglis  could  and  should  have  acknowledged  that  there are 
multiple paradigmatic “fetishizations” which have colonized modern intellectual 
agendas developed in  response  to  the  question  of  what  makes humans  different  
from  non-human  entities. 
(c) In relation to the explanatory level, it is worth drawing attention to the fact 
that Inglis is culpable of conflating the “cultural turn” with the “linguistic turn”. 
Although these two paradigmatic shifts are both historically and intellectually 
interrelated, they  are not the same thing. In essence, the former  is broader  and   
more inclusive than the latter. According to the former, human reality is a cultur-  
ally constructed, and hence spatiotemporally contingent, sphere of existence. Accord- 
ing to the latter, human reality is a linguistically mediated, and thus symbolically 
constituted, province of being. The former perspective is largely associated with 
social constructivism. By contrast, the latter view can be defended from various 
epistemological positions, notably objectivist realism, intersubjectivist normativism 
or projectivist subjectivism: language can be seen as a representational force (“objec- 
tivist correspondence theories of truth”), as a social force (“normativist consensus 
theories of truth”) or as an expressional force (“subjectivist projection theories of 
truth”)——or, indeed, as a combination of these options. 
Owing to his fallacy of conflating the “cultural turn” with the “linguistic turn”, 
Inglis commits the mistake of identifying all language-theoretic and communica- 
tion-theoretic approaches with the constructivist view that the social  world  is a 
realm composed by “a multiplicity of cultural arbitraries”422 and “specific assem- 
blages”423 and that, in this sense, culture can be regarded as “the driver of all 
things”424. This argument, however appealing it may seem in light of Inglis’s legiti- 
mate misgivings about the relativistic implications of social and cultural construc- 
tivism, is based on a gross misrepresentation of “the club of the linguistic-turn- 
inspired poets”; the early Wittgenstein, Gadamer, Ricœur, Habermas and probably 
even the scientistically inclined Bourdieu would find it  difficult  to  subscribe to 
such a one-sided——that is, constructivist——account of language. Language- 
theoretic scholars may have a tendency to consider language as the “house  of  
being”; their analytical representatives, however, regard it as an edifice built upon  
the firm socio-empirical grounds of human rationality, rather than as an arbitrary by-
product of people’s networked interactions with the assemblages of culturally 
constructed realities. 
 
 (d) In relation to the historical level, it is worth making one simple observation: 
if, in the near or remote future, commentators come to the conclusion that the 
differences between Bourdieusian, Habermasian and post-structuralist approaches    
to language “will seem to be utterly trivial”425, as Inglis contends, then this means 
that they have failed to read their works properly. Inglis is right to insist that, in      
the long run, the twentieth-century obsession with language may go down as just 
another fashion-driven fetish of Zeitgeistsurfing. For, in the grand scheme of things, 
language is only one amongst other constitutive components of human existence,   
not to mention the fact that, as pointed out by various natural scientists426, some  
other species also have the capacity to develop at least rudimentary forms of both 
language and culture. Even if, however, we recognize that different approaches to 
language have an awful lot in common, it would be both intellectually naïve and 
analytically inaccurate to ignore the idiosyncrasies that separate them from one 
another. Inglis’s unwillingness to distinguish between the “cultural turn” and the 
“linguistic turn” prevents him from accounting for the presuppositional differences 
between realist, constructivist and subjectivist accounts of language. Far from being 
reducible to “peas in a pod”427, these approaches are embedded in separate “pods 
with peas”. 
(3) The derivative intellectualization of language: According to Inglis, “Susen has 
been too kind to Bourdieu”428, insofar as the article gives the misleading impres-  
sion “that Bourdieu’s understanding of language, and his theoretical position more 
generally, is somehow distinctive, unique and novel”429. Contrary to the view that 
Bourdieu’s account of language is an original and unprecedented one, Inglis claims 
that “the sense that Susen’s paper——presumably unintentionally——gives is in fact 
how derivative much of Bourdieu’s thinking seems”430. More specifically, Inglis 
comes to the conclusion that most of the central aspects covered in my article con- 
firm the suspicion that Bourdieu remains caught up in “very standard Saussurean 
and post-Saussurean ideas about language”431 and fails to add any——substantially 
new——insights to those already formulated by thinkers such as Saussure, Nietz- 
sche, Wittgenstein, Weber, Gramsci and Vološinov. Given the prominence of their 
reflections on language in the French sociologist’s writings, Inglis maintains that 
“Susen should make clearer what, if anything, is novel in Bourdieu’s appropriation 
and use of such ideas”432. Somewhat provocatively, Inglis refers to this concern as 
follows: 
 
[…] the effect of Susen’s portrayal […] is to make Bourdieu seem very derivative of 
Weber, and beyond him, Nietzsche. […] Language as a tool of power; language as  
power; the linguistic expressions of power; language as the primary means of domina- 
tion and legitimacy; language as a covert mechanism of oppression; language as the 
medium of social struggles——all of these points are Weberian and Nietzschean in tenor. 
This raises an issue troubling for Bourdieusians; is this derivativeness merely a product  
of the way Susen has narrated the story, or is Bourdieu essentially a not-very-interesting 
epigone of two much greater thinkers?433 
 
 One might add another troubling point——what is there in Bourdieu, on language or 
indeed on anything else, that really goes beyond or is an improvement on Gramsci? […] 
And, in terms of the terminology used, is Bourdieu not inferior to Gramsci, insofar as   
the former has placed himself inside the straitjacket of the “economistic” language of 
capitals, a self-imposed restriction from which Gramsci would very likely have shied 
away?434 
 
[…] did Bourdieu say anything more interesting or conceptually superior to what 
Vološinov  argued half a century before? My suspicion is probably not, but such an    
issue needs systematic exploration.435 
Let me, in response to these charges, make two straightforward points. 
(a) It is true that I could have spelled out what is new and original about 
Bourdieu’s account of language, and possibly about my own Bourdieu-inspired 
approach to language.  Yet,  as  I  have  already  mentioned  in  my  replies  to some 
of the other commentaries, the purpose of my  article  was  not  exegesis.  The  
danger arising from the Anglophone obsession with “big names”, “labels” and 
“brands of thought” is  that  we  lose  sight  of  what  is  most  important:  namely,  
the arguments and insights themselves, regardless of the symbolic power of those 
who have articulated them. Apart from the obvious and explicit focus on Bour-    
dieu, my study is based on a thematically structured argument,  developed  in  
relation to 10 central features of language. Inglis may want to consider writing          
a piece centring upon 10 key thinkers——Saussure, Nietzsche,  Wittgenstein,  
Weber, Gramsci, Vološinov, etc.——which are omnipresent in Bourdieu. Such an 
author-focused analysis would be a perfectly legitimate way of making sense of 
language through the eyes of scholars who have influenced Bourdieu. I am not    
sure, however, to what extent such a project would permit us to  gain  further  
insights into the nature of language. In fact, it is these insights, rather than the 
theorists to whom we owe them, that enable us to contribute to a better  
understanding  of language. 
(b) It is true that large parts of Bourdieu’s oeuvre are derivative of the writ-    
ings of other scholars, but to me this  seems  to  be  a  truism,  as  this  applies  to 
every influential intellectual. The most original minds will have drawn upon the 
works of previous  thinkers.  The  question  remains,  of  course,  what  Bourdieu  
and Bourdieu-inspired writers have added to  the  picture.  With  regard  to  my 
article, the short answer to this question is as follows: it is the combination of         
the 10 features of language identified in my study  which  makes  Bourdieu’s  
account unique and innovative. One may  provide  solid  grounds  on  which  to  
reject the triadic terminology of “field”, “habitus” and “capital”, notably because      
of the “economistic”436 baggage that  goes  along  with  it.  Moreover,  one  may  
have good reason to discard my  own——socio-ontological——account  of  lan-  
guage, arguing that it is overly systematic and too remote from Bourdieu’s own 
words. The point, however, is to recognize that the fine-grained analysis of the 
intrinsic relationship between  all  of  the  aforementioned  10  features  has  not  
been  accomplished before. 
 
 Far from being guilty of the “uncritical appropriation of Saussurean ideas”437, 
Bourdieu has both drawn upon and challenged the Saussurean, as well as other 
theoretical, traditions in multiple ways.438 (i) Saussure’s account lacks a critical 
analysis of linguistic practices as field-specific interactions. (ii) Nietzsche’s writings 
do not interpret the “will to power” as a “will to language”, let alone as a “will to   
the acquisition of linguistic capital”. (iii) The late Wittgenstein does not conceive     
of life forms as social fields and of language games as field-specific symbolic strug- 
gles. (iv) Weber’s studies, whilst recognizing the meaning-ladenness of human exis- 
tence, do not offer a critical approach to markets of symbolic goods. (v) Gramsci’s 
conception of hegemony, although it escapes the straitjacket imposed by the reduc- 
tive logic of the orthodox Marxist story of economic determinacy, fails to do jus-  
tice to the polycentric complexity of field-divided realities. (vi) Vološinov’s 
remarkable Marxism and the philosophy of language439 is only the beginning of a 
decisive move towards Post-Marxism and the sociology of language, a book that still 
needs to be written. —— All of these, admittedly scattered, remarks illustrate that it 
would be erroneous to brush Bourdieu aside and claim that he and his followers  
have failed to make substantial contributions to age-old controversies in the study    
of language. 
(4) The  over-complexification  of  language:  Inglis  suggests  that  it  is  “rather 
unfair”440 and “somewhat ungenerous”441 to criticize Bourdieu for constructing a 
binary division “between more orthodox and more heterodox languages”442. To be 
sure, Inglis concedes that “Susen correctly points out that a particular linguistic    
field may be more complicated than that, involving languages or speaking posi-   
tions that are ambiguous admixtures of more heterodox and more orthodox ter- 
minologies and world-views”443. Inglis insists, however, “that dynamics of 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy are clearly at work”444 in the unfolding of discursively 
mediated social interactions and that, in a more general sense, one should only 
“expect a model to highlight the most essential aspects of the phenomena in 
question”445. 
Let me comment on the contention that “the orthodoxy/heterodoxy dyad seems 
like an eminently sensible conceptual foundation for the analysis of language”446 and 
on the accusation that this is “a point that […] Susen should have more warmly 
acknowledged”447. I share Inglis’s view that “it seems entirely sensible of Bourdieu  
to set up a basic model of orthodoxy and heterodoxy in language”448  and that, even   
if “empirical refinement”449 is needed, this dichotomous framework captures an 
important aspect of field-embedded, and hence interest-laden and power-laden, dis- 
courses. The whole point of my reflections on the discursive aspects of language is  
to support Bourdieu’s model, but by drawing attention to the fact that the com- 
plexity of language games often escapes this binary logic. In this respect, it may be 
useful to distinguish between simplifying and simplistic models. To the extent that 
this explanatory framework is not used as a conceptual straitjacket, Inglis and I   
agree that we are dealing with a simplifying, rather than a simplistic, model. I do 
consider the 10 key features identified in my article as inherent in language; on this 
account, all of them are “eminently sensible conceptual foundation[s] for the analy- 
 
 sis of language”450. This does not absolve us, however, from reflecting upon the 
explanatory limitations of Bourdieu’s approach to linguistic  forms. 
(5) The idealization of language:  This point of critique is closely interrelated 
with Inglis’s scepticism towards (a) socio-ontological idealism, (b) naïve anti- 
determinism and (c) left-liberal  Zeitgeist-opportunism. 
(a) Inglis’s reservations about socio-ontological idealism are summarized in the 
following assertion: 
 
A model of human doings inspired in large part by the image of homo ludens would       
no doubt be guilty of downplaying or missing altogether the more, let us say, unpleas-  
ant aspects of human life on which Bourdieu focuses——namely the dynamics of 
domination,  misrecognition  and oppression.451 
According to Inglis,  not  only  Bourdieu  but  also  “other  great  thinkers  such  
as Machiavelli, Hobbes,  Kierkegaard  and  Schopenhauer”452  are  right  to  remind 
us of the “nastiness implicit in everything we do”453. For the very possibility of       
an emancipatory society depends on our  recognition  of  the  dark  sides  of 
humanity. 
(b) Inglis’s misgivings about naïve anti-determinism come to the fore in his 
relentless attack on the “Bourdieu is a determinist”454 thesis. As he remarks, 
Bourdieu’s perspective tends to be “associated with a hyper-deterministic theory      
of the all-consuming power of social class”455. Inglis, however, makes the chal- 
lenging claim that “Bourdieu was not determinist enough”456, since——contrary to 
common wisdom——he “put too much emphasis on creativity, innovation, 
thoughtfulness”457. Fully aware of  the  fact  that  “[t]his  is  an  argument  likely  to 
be loathed by most social theorists”458,  as  it  “breaks  the  rules  of  the  linguistic 
and ideological consensus”459  of what is widely considered as progressive think-  
ing, Inglis nevertheless insists on the structural determinacy of literally all forms      
of human sociality. Inspired by his anthropological pessimism, Inglis makes a 
provocative prediction: 
 
In time, Bourdieu’s ideas will not seem dated because of the class-based determinism—
—for given the history of human existence up until the present time, where strati- 
fication into classes or something like them has been the norm in all societies of a   
certain level of complexity and above, that class determinism may well be the factor    
that makes them  ever-relevant.460 
(c) Inglis’s suspicions about left-liberal Zeitgeist-opportunism are conveyed in 
the contention that critiques of sociological determinism are founded on idealist 
assumptions about the existence of altruistic dispositions. These are believed to be 
built into human nature and romanticized within  the  ideological  framework  of  
“the liberal and left-liberal optimistic world-view”461, endorsed by thinkers who are 
committed to the humanistically inspired celebration of “the alleged creativity and 
thoughtfulness of all individuals”462. This doxa——as Inglis asserts in a “politically 
incorrect” fashion, the tenor of which illustrates that he is certainly not a 
Boltanskian——permits researchers to “be far more happily received in left-liberal 
 
 academic circles than someone who declares the fundamental ignorance and  
stupidity of most or all people”463. 
(a) Let me respond to Inglis’s reservations about socio-ontological idealism. I run 
the risk of repeating myself in this “Reply”, but the whole point of my attempt to 
cross-fertilize the works of Bourdieu and Habermas464 is to challenge the former’s 
socio-ontological pessimism and the latter’s socio-ontological optimism, with the aim 
of endorsing a critical position based on socio-ontological realism. Certainly, it 
would be erroneous to reduce homo sapiens either to a homo ludens or to a homo 
lupus. Furthermore, Inglis is right to stress that “we cannot expect any model of 
human life to capture all dimensions of it”465. Yet, to assert that there is “nastiness 
implicit in everything we do”466 means to succumb to socio-ontological fatalism 
under the banner of field-theoretic determinism. By no means have I ever suggested 
that there are any social actions which “are beyond the dynamics of power”467, as 
Inglis implies by putting these words in my mouth. As I have argued in my article 
and elsewhere, however, “[t]he fact that symbolic relations are unavoidably power- 
laden […] does not mean that they are necessarily power-driven”468. In other words, 
“the fact that every social action is power-permeated does not mean that every social 
action is power-motivated”469. Instead of portraying social lifeworlds either as com- 
municative realms of pristine intersubjectivity and mutual comprehension or as 
strategic battlegrounds of constant struggle and relentless competition, we need to 
face up to both the bright and the dark sides of symbolic  interactionality  and  
thereby recognize the normative ambivalence underlying human sociality. 
(b) Let me comment on Inglis’s misgivings about naïve  anti-determinism. In  this 
respect, Inglis affirms that “Susen makes the mistake of repeating some of       the 
usual charges against Bourdieu”470. The fact that this is a common criticism, 
however, does not mean that it is an illegitimate, let alone insignificant, point of 
dispute. Anyone familiar with the  secondary  literature  on  Bourdieu  will  know  
that the problem of sociological determinism  is one of  the key  issues raised  by  
both his unsympathetic and his sympathetic critics. One does not have to be a 
Boltanskian to recognize that Bourdieu has both a tendency to underestimate the 
normative significance of people’s critical, moral and discursive capacities and a 
tendency to overestimate the  structuring  influence  of  power  relations  upon  
human interactions and reflections.471 Inglis’s assertion that “Bourdieu was not 
determinist enough”472 may sound provocative. Yet, unless he is able to provide  
solid textual and empirical evidence to substantiate this claim, it is hardly more    
than a rhetorically playful and potentially challenging, but ultimately untenable, 
contention. 
I share Inglis’s concerns regarding widespread forms of hypocrisy in the aca- 
demic field, one of which is expressed in the fact that those who complain about 
Bourdieu’s alleged determinism, as well as his categorical rejection of the naïve  belief 
in epistemic neutrality and disinterestedness, are usually the ones who, often with- 
out knowing it, are “keen to promote their own interests in the academic field”473. 
These are, however, two different levels of analysis: the existence of academic hypoc- 
risy does not justify Bourdieu’s overemphasis on structural determinacy and his  fail- 
 
 ure to do justice to the sociological importance of the normative resources mobi- 
lized  by  virtue  of  critical  reflexivity.   To   put   it   bluntly,   instrumentally   
driven behavioural patterns common in academic life do not suffice to provide large-
scale corroborative evidence in support of “Bourdieu’s agonistic view of human 
life”474. Even if we acknowledge the existence of a “phenomenological Bourdieu” 
and consider the habitus as “a sort of hermeneutic hero”475, there is no doubt that the 
“positivist,  realist and determinist” Bourdieu has far more muscle  than his 
“interpretivist, constructivist and voluntarist” counterpart. Just as Bourdieu was a 
philosophe by training and a sociologue by choice, he was a subjectivist  at heart and 
an objectivist in his head. 
(c) Let me finish with a brief remark on Inglis’s suspicions about left-liberal 
Zeitgeist-opportunism. As already indicated in some of my previous reflections, it 
seems to me that Inglis’s reservations about Zeitgeist- and paradigm-surfing are 
entirely justified. If, however, we insist upon “the fundamental ignorance and 
stupidity of most or all people”476, then we are culpable not only of falling back     
into the trap of the  “false  consciousness”477  thesis,  but  also  of  advocating  the 
sort of intellectualist elitism which Bourdieu himself despised and sought to 
overcome. Undoubtedly, Inglis makes both a legitimate and an  important  point 
when denouncing the hypocrisy of left-liberal intellectuals who, on the surface, 
appear to take ordinary actors seriously——by insisting on their reflexivity,  
creativity, dignity, common humanity  and  capacity  for  universal  solidarity——,  
but who, in practice, play the game of cut-throat competition and ruthless posi- 
tioning in the struggle over access to material and symbolic resources in a power-
driven society. It is difficult not to empathize  with  Inglis’s  cynicism  towards the 
proselytizing mission of academic enlighteners, who appear to be committed to 
selflessness and philanthropy, whilst essentially being motivated by self-interest and 
calculative concerns of utility. The key——tension-laden——challenge with which 
we are confronted when reflecting upon real speech situations, then, is both to accept 
and to reject the will to power by mobilizing the will to reason. 
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